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Abstract:
In 2018, President Trump signed a federal "right to try" law, claiming that it
would give desperately ill patients earlier access to unapproved medicines, by
allowing the patient, doctor, and drug company to arrange for access without
federal oversight. Critics of the law argued that it would not meaningfully increase
access to experimental medicines, because federal oversight was not the obstacle
in the first place. And they were correct. U.S. law already permitted companies
to provide terminally ill patients with early access to unapproved medicines. The
problem was instead that companies did not take advantage of this option. This
Article offers new insights into U.S. law on early access, as well as the new right-
to-try law, by offering a comparative perspective using French law. We explore
the historical, legal, and cultural differences between France and the United States
that may explain differences in their early access systems and why the right-to-try
law emerged in one country but not the other. The differing approaches reflect in
part differing reactions to arguments grounded in personal autonomy and patients'
rights, when held up against utilitarian arguments for premarket approval and
traditions of medical paternalism. Using the French experience, this Article also
considers the possibility that the key to increasing use of expanded access in the
United States might be financial: making it worthwhile for companies, by allowing
them to profit from sales, and making the medicines and associated healthcare
services free for patients through insurance coverage.
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In spring 2014, a first-grader with cancer became a poster child for the
growing "right to try" movement in the United States. When Josh Hardy was nine
months old, doctors diagnosed him with a malignant, highly aggressive, and rare
form of kidney cancer.' After successful treatment, he faced recurrences in 2008
and again in 2009, before being declared "cancer-free for two years" in May 2013.2
But in the fall of 2013, doctors diagnosed him with myelodysplastic syndrome,
bone marrow failure stemming from years of chemotherapy and radiation
treatments.3 Josh received a bone marrow transplant in early 2014, but weakening
of his immune system led to a life-threatening adenovirus infection.4 After
receiving the standard of care for this infection-cidofovir-led to kidney failure,
Josh was out of options. There were no other approved drugs to treat the infection.
Josh's physicians at St. Jude Children's Hospital in Tennessee turned to an
unapproved drug, brincidofovir, made by Chimerix Inc., a small company based
in North Carolina.5 The company was in the middle of a phase 3 clinical trial-the
last trial needed for regulatory approval-but they were studying the use of this
drug in preventing cytomegalovirus (CMV) reactivation in adult stem cell
transplant recipients, a different indication.6 The company had also just released
promising results from a small study using brincidofovir to treat early adenovirus
infections in stem cell transplant patients.7 Without a doubt, the federal
government would have permitted Chimerix to provide Josh the drug on a
"compassionate use" basis under its "expanded access" regulations." Under these
regulations, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) permits a company to
provide an unapproved drug to a patient with a serious or life-threatening condition
who is not enrolled in its clinical trials, if certain conditions are met. The company
must be willing to provide the drug, however, and it has to ask FDA for permission
before proceeding. Chimerix turned the doctors and family down, however, saying
1. Kenneth I. Moch, Ethical crossroads: expanded access, patient advocacy, and the
#Savelosh social media campaign, 1 MED. ACCESS @ POINT OF CARE e119 (2017),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.5301/maapoc.0000019 [https://perma.cc/34KB-MREY].
Moch was Chief Executive Officer of Chimerix during the events described in the article.
2. Elena Gerasimov, Saved Josh: The Gears of a Successful Patient Advocacy Campaign,
KIDS V. CANCER 1-2 (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.kidsvcancer.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Hardy-Case-Study-final-March-9-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4D2-
UQTY].
3. Id.; Moch, supra note 1, at e122.
4. Moch, supra note 1, at e122.
5. Gerasimov, supra note 2, at 3.
6. Moch, supra note 1, at e121.
7. Moch, supra note 1, at e121. Statistical significance had not been achieved, but the study
showed numerical benefit in virologic response, treatment failures, and mortality.
8. See infra Section 2. Commitment to the Gatekeeping Model.
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that it wanted to focus on enrolling patients in the ongoing CMV trial to complete
the research needed for approval.9 The family turned to social media, which led to
a barrage of phone calls and emails to the company from the public and from state
and federal legislators, media headlines such as "Company denies drug to dying
child," and death threats against family members of the company's Chief
Executive Officer.'0
Facing this onslaught, Chimerix worked with FDA to design and launch a
twenty-patient study of the drug for the treatment of adenovirus infections in
immunocompromised patients, in which Josh would be the first enrolled patient."
On March 12, 2014, he received his first dose.'2 Nineteen days later the virus was
undetectable, and ten days later Josh left the hospital.13 This opened the floodgates.
Three days after announcing the trial, the company received six more requests for
the drug, and within six months the company had enrolled eighty patients in its
twenty-patient study. '" Although the drug eliminated Josh's viral infection, his
cancer eventually returned, and he died in September 2016."5
The story made national news, and for the next few years it played a role in a
larger public debate about the rights of dying patients to try experimental
medicines to save their own lives and the proper role of the federal government-
if any-in limiting those rights. Just one month before the Josh Hardy firestorm
hit social media, the Goldwater Institute published a paper arguing that every state
should enact a "right to try" measure, which it had drafted, to "allow terminal
9. Gerasimov, supra note 2, at 2-3.
10. Moch, supra note 1, at e125; see Elizabeth Cohen, Company Denies Drug to Dying Child,
CNN HEALTH (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/health/cohen-josh/index.html
[https://perma.cc/CSB4-86DW].
11. Moch, supra note 1, at e125. Because the drug was unapproved and the company had
decided against providing expanded access, a formal clinical trial designed to support approval of the
drug for Josh's condition was the only legal mechanism by which Josh could receive the drug.
12. Id.
13. Id.; David Kroll, Josh Hardy Going Home After Getting Chimerix Anti-Viral Drug, FORBES
(Jul. 17, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2014/07/17/josh-hardy-going-home-after-
getting-chimerix-anti-viral-drug [https://perma.cc/A48J-KR82].
14. Moch, supra note 1, at e 126. Although the drug eventually failed its phase 3 trial in CMV,
Chimerix is still studying the drug's antiviral activity. See Press Release, Chimerix, Chimerix
Presents Results from Post-hoc Analysis of Phase 3 Study (Feb. 22, 2019),
https ://ir.chimerix.com/news-releases/news-release-details/chimerix-presents-results-post-hoc-
analysis-phase-3-study [https://perma.cc/42LU-WV63]; Jessica Merrill, Chimerix Sees Options For
Brincidofovir Despite Disappointing CMV Data, PINK SHEET (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS07913 5/Chimerix-Sees-Options-For-Brincidofovir-
Despite-Disappointing-CMV-Data.
15. Cathy Dyson, "Now He is Healed"; Mourning the Death of 10-Year-Old Josh Hardy,






patients access to investigational drugs that have completed basic safety testing."6
This was not a new idea: U.S. policymakers and courts had heard similar
arguments for decades.7 But the arguments gained traction this time, and after
more than two-thirds of the states enacted right-to-try laws, the federal government
followed suit.' Under the federal right-to-try law, a patient, doctor, and rug
company can proceed to treatment with an unapproved medicine without seeking
permission first from the federal government. Expanded access, in contrast,
requires FDA's permission.
But the problem for Josh was not federal law in the first place. His problem
was that Chimerix refused to provide brincidofovir on a compassionate basis
outside of a conventional clinical trial. And Chimerix was not an outlier. Drug
companies often decline to provide experimental medicines to dying patients who
do not qualify for ongoing trials.19 The federal right-to-try law addressed a few
reasons companies may decline requests-specifically, concerns about liability
exposure and concerns that adverse events will affect the medicine's approval or
labeling-but seemingly as an afterthought. It was not a fully fleshed-out attempt
to improve access to investigational drugs so much as an attempt to cut FDA out
of the process. And because FDA was not the problem in the first place, there
remains a serious question whether the law will have any effect on access to
experimental medicines.
Many scholars have explored the ethical arguments for providing early access
to unapproved medicines on a compassionate basis.20 There is also a rich body of
16. Christina Corieri, Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill to
Take Control of Their Treatment, GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 1 (Feb. 11, 2014),
https ://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/cmspagemedia/2015/1/29
/Right%20To%20Try.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW4Y-SA9H].
17. See infra Section 0.
18. See Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right-to-try legislation, CNN
HEALTH (May 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-
explainer/index.html [https://perma.cc/LH9Y-KM8F] (noting that thirty-eight states had passed
right-to-try laws).
19. Gail A. Van Norman, Expanding Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Single Patient
Investigational New Drug and the "Right to Try", 3 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 280, 287
(2018) ("Although companies have developed internal pathways by which individual patients can
achieve access to investigational drugs, the majority of such requests are denied."); Lewis A.
Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627,632 (2014) ("The
pharmaceutical industry has never been enthusiastic about expanded access programs for
unapproved, investigational therapies.").
20. E.g., Eline Bunnik, Nikkie Aarts & Suzanne van de Vathorst, The Changing Landscape of
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Patients with Unmet Medical Needs: Ethical
Implications, 10 J. PHARMACY POL'Y & PRAC., Feb. 21, 2017, at 1; Eline Bunnik, Nikkie Aarts &
Suzanne van de Vathorst Little to Lose and No Other Options: Ethical Issues in Efforts to Facilitate
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, 122 HEALTH POL'Y 977 (2018); Arthur Caplan, Is It
Sound Public Policy to Let the Terminally Ill Access Experimental Medical Innovations?, 7 AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Jun. 1, 2007, at 1; Arthur Caplan & Kenneth Moch, Rescue Me: The Challenge of
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legal and public policy literature on these issues and on the history of expanded
access in the United States.2 1 This Article offers fresh insights on early access
schemes, by providing a comparative perspective using French law. Both the
United States and France use a regulatory gatekeeper for new medicines, requiring
premarket approval based on testing data. Both legal systems have evolved in the
last half century to permit access before approval in some cases: under "expanded
access" in the United States and "temporary authorization for use" (ATU) in
France. Functionally, the early access schemes are similar, preserving a
gatekeeping mechanism and respecting the basic premises and goals of the new
medicine preapproval paradigm. But the schemes differ in their genesis and
specifics, and they operate within fundamentally different healthcare finance
systems. We explore the historical, legal, and cultural differences between the two
countries that may explain these differences. These same differences help explain
why the right-to-try law-which rejects the basic premises and goals of the
preapproval paradigm-emerged in the United States but is unlikely to emerge in
France.
This Article makes two claims. First, the differences between the two
countries' approaches to early access and right-to-try reflect in part differing
reactions to arguments grounded in personal autonomy and patients' rights, when
held up against utilitarian arguments for premarket approval and traditions of
medical paternalism. New drug approval schemes are utilitarian, using the barrier
Compassionate Use in the Social Media Era, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, Aug. 27, 2014,
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140827.041027/full/ [https://perma.cc/RDR3-
L5ES]; Daniele Carrieri, Fedro A. Peccatori & Giovanni Boniolo, The Ethical Plausibility of the
"Right o Try"Laws, 122 CRITICAL REV. ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 64, 66 (2018); Audrey Chapman,
Proposal for Patient Obligations for Access to Unapproved Interventions: Both Too Much and Not
Enough, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 17, 2014, at 25; Kasper Raus, An Analysis of Common Ethical
Justifications for Compassionate Use Programs for Experimental Drugs, 17 BMC MED. ETHICS, Oct.
18, 2016, at 1; Udo Schkldenk & Christopher Lowry, Terminal illness and access to phase 1
experimental agents, surgeries, and devices: reviewing the ethical arguments, 89 BRITISH MED.
BULL. 7, 9 (2009); Mary Jean Walker, Wendy A. Rogers & Vikki Entwistle, Ethical Justifications
for Access to Unapproved Medical Interventions: An Argument for (Limited) Patient Obligations, 14
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 17, 2014, at 3, 4.
21. E.g., Rebecca Dresser, The "Right to Try" Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in
the Access Debate, 93 TEX. L. REv. 1631 (2015); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public's Right to
Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1335, 1343-44 (2009);
Michael J. Malinowski, Throwing Dirt on Doctor Frankenstein's Grave: Access to Experimental
Treatments at the End of Life, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 615 (2014); Seema Shah & Patricia Zettler, From a
Constitutional Right to a Policy of Exceptions: Abigail Alliance and the Future of Access to
Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y LAW & ETHICS 136, 178-79 (2010); Eugene
Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120
HARV. L. REv. 1813 (2007); Patricia J. Zettler, The Implications of Post-Phase 1 and Off-Label
Treatment Use of Experimental Drugs: How Expansive Should Expanded Access Be?, 18 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 135 (2009); Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State "Right-




to entry as leverage to force the production of robust scientific data to support new
medicines. They are also paternalistic, because the approval decision in any
particular case requires judgment calls about the value and significance of specific
benefits, which stray well beyond the science and trump whatever judgment call a
particular patient might have made. Both countries enacted early access schemes
in response to arguments from patient groups newly empowered in the AIDS era,
who were seeking greater control over their own medical care and the right to
accept the risk of using unproven medicines when facing death. Arguments
grounded in autonomy principles and rights-based jurisprudence have had more
salience in the United States than in France, however, driving some differences
between expanded access and ATUs. And right-to-try laws found traction in the
United States due to a seeming alliance between patients making arguments
grounded in autonomy and rights-based jurisprudence and groups advocating for
reduction in the size and power of the federal government.
Second, the right-to-try law is unlikely to increase access to unapproved
medicines, and we use the French experience to hypothesize changes to the U.S.
expanded access scheme that would increase access. Most importantly, we
consider the possibility that the key to increasing use of expanded access in the
United States might be financial: making it worthwhile for companies to supply
unapproved medicines, by allowing them to profit from sales, and making the
medicines and associated healthcare services free for patients through insurance
coverage. The French minimize the fiscal impact of these choices by also imposing
price controls, however, and it is unclear whether U.S. policymakers and the public
would accept the full French approach. Adopting a partial solution, such as
permitting profit but not mandating insurance coverage, or vice versa, may be
ineffective, raise new issues, or both.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section I explains the basic approach to
medicine regulation in both countries-premarket review of scientific data by an
expert agency-and how the modern premarket review model differs from an
earlier model of postmarket enforcement power. It also explains the tradeoff
inherent in premarket approval paradigms-that requiring data delays patient
access to potential treatments-and iscusses the paternalism and utilitarianism in
the premarket review model.
Section II explains how shifts in thinking about the relationship between
individual and government on matters of health led to refinement of the French
and U.S. gatekeeping frameworks with laws that permit access to medicines before
approval. It explains how these arrangements responded to autonomy and patient
rights arguments but are broadly consistent with the approach and goals of the new
drug approval paradigm. Further, it explains how the differences between the two
schemes reflect broader sociocultural and legal differences tied to the weight given
to autonomy and patients' rights arguments and views on medical paternalism.
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Section III describes the U.S. right-to-try law, comparing it to expanded access,
and exploring the social and cultural differences between the countries that made
this law possible in the United States.
Section IV addresses steps that U.S. policymakers may need to take to
increase use while preserving, rather than sidestepping, the basic regulatory
framework in place for new medicines. It borrows heavily from the successful
French early access scheme in exploring the possibility that the impediments are
mainly financial, though it also considers other changes that might be needed.
I. THE NEW MEDICINE GATEKEEPING MODEL
In both the United States and France, a new medicine must be approved as
safe and effective by a regulator-FDA and the Agency for Medicines and Health
Product Safety (ANSM), respectively-before it can be placed on the market for
use by patients.2
A. The Premarket Approval Requirement
The premarket approval requirement reflects two basic assumptions: first, that
society has a profound interest in the generation of high-quality evidence about the
effectiveness and safety of new medicines, and second, that the evidentiary
standard should serve as a barrier to entry, enforced by an agency composed of
scientific experts.23 These assumptions come from hard lessons in history.
Congress enacted the basic statute requiring premarket safety review of drugs in
22. There are two pathways to market for an innovative new medicine in the United States:
approval of a new drug application submitted under § 355(b)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, or, if the drug is biological, a biologics license application submitted under section
351(a) of the Public Health Service Act. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2018).
There are four pathways to market in France: (1) approval by the French National Agency for
Medicines and Health Product Safety (ANSM) under Article L.5121-8 of the French Public Health
Code; (2) for certain types of medicine, centralized approval by the European Commission following
review by the European Medicines Agency; (3) simultaneous approval for France and other
individual EU Member States (chosen by the company) under a decentralized procedure, in which
one country takes the lead in review of the application; and (4) approval through "mutual
recognition," in which a company asks France to respect the decision of another EU Member State
that has approved the medicine. See CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. L.5121-
8 (Fr.); Regulation No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004
Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorisation and Supervision of Medicinal Products
for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency, 2004 O.J. (L 136)
1, 5-6, 33 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 726/2004]; Directive 2001/83 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for
Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 331) 67 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 2001/83]; EUR. COMM'N, THE RULES
GOVERNING MEDICINAL PRODUCTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION vol. 2A, ch. 1, § 3.2 (2019).
23. See Erika Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of FDA's New Drug Authorities,




1938 on the heels of a tragedy in which an inadequately tested sulfanilamide
preparation killed more than one hundred people, including many children.24
Without a premarket review requirement, FDA was left to pursue the company
after the fact for misbranding the drug.25 Changes to the statute in 1962 converted
the premarket review requirement into a premarket approval requirement with a
robust effectiveness standard, following a tragedy in which more than 10,000
children in forty-six countries were born with severe deformities after their
mothers used thalidomide during pregnancy.26
The new approach shifted the burden of proof to companies seeking to market
medicines. This ensures the production of high-quality data to support use and
prescribing decisions.27 It also gives the regulator-the gatekeeper-more power.
The ability to grant or withhold permission to enter the market provides powerful
leverage during the research process. And enforcement of the premarket approval
requirement is far more efficient than any regime that places the burden on the
government to begin proceedings and prove there is something wrong after a
medicine enters the market.28
In both countries, proof of safety and effectiveness takes the form of data from
laboratory and animal testing as well as human ("clinical") trials.29 Developing
these data is an iterative process. After trials in relevant animals show that a new
24. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); DANIEL
CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION
AT THE FDA 85-92 (2010).
25. U.S. Dep't. of Agric., Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture Transmitting in Response
to Senate Resolution No. 194 a Report on Elixir Sulfanilamide-Massengill, S. Doc. No. 75-124 at 1,
9 (" [T]he only basis of action under the Food and Drugs Act against the interstate distribution of the
'elixir' was the allegation that he word implies an alcoholic solution, whereas the product was a
diethylene glycol solution ... [and] [t]o protect the public from drugs which, like the 'elixir' are
dangerous because of their inherent toxicity, it is the Department's recommendation that legislation
be enacted to provide . . . [l]icense control of new drugs.").
26. CARPENTER, supra note 24, at 213-97.
27. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOM. &
TECH. L. REV. 345, 370-71 (2007); Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA 's Role in
Information Production, Past and Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357 passim (2018).
28. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products,
82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1797 (1996).
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2018) (standard for approval of a new drug in the United States);
42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 601 (2020) (standard for approval for a biological product in
the United States); CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. L.5121-9 (Fr.) (grounds
for denying approval of a medicine in France); id. art. L.5121-20 (indicating that more detailed rules,
including those governing trials, will be set forth in decrees). A company does not repeat the process
for each country in which it seeks approval. Although some regulators may require trials that others
do not-such as trials in a local population-companies are usually able to use the same pivotal
safety and effectiveness data. The actual applications will be different, reflecting each regulator's
content and format requirements, including with respect to the types of analysis performed and the
types of detailed reports written.
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drug is safe to begin testing in humans, the applicant begins with small safety tests
and moves gradually to larger and larger trials.30 Phase 1 trials entail the initial
introduction of the investigational medicine in humans and focus on questions of
absorption, distribution, metabolism, excretion, and side effects of increasing
dose.31 These trials sometimes also generate early evidence of effectiveness, if the
subjects are patients rather than healthy volunteers.32 Phase 2 trials assess the
effectiveness of the medicine in patients, as well as common short-term side effects
and risks.33 The pivotal trials providing statistically robust proof of effectiveness-
phase 3 trials-often involve thousands of patients and clinical trial sites around
the world.34
The three-phase approach dates to the 1960s and is somewhat obsolete.35
Today, there are few hard-and-fast rules about clinical trial design. A company's
premarket clinical development program will usually include trials that can be
classified as phase 1, phase 2, or phase 3. But some companies start with a "phase
0" trial to examine administration of a micro-dose to a very small group of
volunteers, and companies often run trials that combine elements of phase 1 and
phase 2, or phase 2 and phase 3.36 Regardless of the design of the overall research
program, the goal is the same. Regulators look for randomized, controlled, double-
blinded, prospective, interventional trials, which are the gold standard for approval
of a new medicine.37 If these trials are large enough, they can support a conclusion
that the tested drug is effective, meaning that it causes the therapeutic benefit
measured.38
30. See Lietzan, Access Before Evidence, supra note 23, at 1246-47.
31. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2020).
32. E.g., id. Most phase 1 trials use healthy volunteers, but phase 1 trials of oncology drugs
and other drugs with narrow therapeutic indices that are intended for life-threatening conditions are
often conducted in patients. The decision whether to recruit healthy volunteers or patients is made on
a case-by-case basis, considering a variety of factors relating to the safety of the trial participants and
the quality of the data being generated. E.g., Jie Shen et al., Design and Conduct Considerations for
First-in-Human Trials, 12 CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 6 (2019).
33. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2020).
34. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2020).
35. New Drugs for Investigational Use: Proposed Exemptions, 27 Fed. Reg. 7,990, 7,990-91
(Aug. 10, 1962).
36. E.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY
IND STUDIES (Jan. 2006), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-
documents/exploratory-ind-studies [https://perma.cc/NVS4-43BG].
37. Vinay Prasad & Vance W. Berger, Hard-Wired Bias: How Even Double-Blind Randomized
Controlled Trials Can Be Skewedfrom the Start, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1171, 1171 (2015) ("Well-
designed, adequately-powered randomized controlled trials ... are rightfully considered the highest
form of evidence on which to base treatment and diagnostic decisions, minimizing potential biases,
particularly confounding, that plague nonrandomized evidence.").
38. Thomas R. Frieden, Evidence for Health Decision Making Beyond Randomized
Controlled Trials, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465, 465 (2017); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:




Whether the data support a finding of effectiveness, and whether the applicant
has conducted all reasonably applicable safety testing, are scientific judgments.
The new medicine frameworks in France and the United States appropriately give
these calls to expert agencies composed of scientists. By assigning the job of
application review to agencies staffed by scientists, the frameworks ensure that the
data supporting each new medicine face at least one formal structured assessment
grounded in science.39
B. Paternalism and Utilitarianism in the Premarket Model
No medicine is, however, perfectly safe or always effective in the patients for
whom it is labeled. Patients are heterogeneous, and clinical responses vary.40 Side
effects are inevitable; medicines are biologically active, and the relationship
between a patient's body and a chemical product can be complex.41 As a result,
when approving a new medicine for the market, the most a regulator can ask for is
proof that a medicine's benefits outweigh its risks.42
It is, however, impossible to be certain about this.43 No premarket research
and development program can generate complete information about a medicine's
clinical profile.44 In clinical trials the experimental medicine is administered under
tightly controlled conditions, to ensure that the resulting data can be interpreted. In
https://www.fda.gov/media/71336/download [https://perma.cc/4F73-86D8].
39. See Robert M. Temple, Commentary on "The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products," 82 VA. L. REv. 1877, 1898 (1996) ("[A]part from contributing independent
review, the existence of the regulator helps maintain the safety assessment enterprise, as public
standards, applicable to all parties, assure a level playing field and discourage excessive corner-
cutting.").
40. E.g., Richard L. Kravitz, Naihua Duan & Joel Braslow, Evidence-Based Medicine,
Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects, and the Trouble with Averages, 82 MILLBANK Q. 661, 699 (2004)
("Even if the treatment is delivered uniformly, the outcomes will still vary because, as noted earlier,
individual patients differ according to their preexisting risk without treatment, responsiveness to
treatment, vulnerability to side effects, and health state preferences or utilities."); see also Anup
Malani, Oliver Bembom & Mark van der Laan, Accounting for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in
the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 23, 24 (2012) ("It is common for drugs to have
different effects in different patients, a phenomenon statisticians call 'heterogeneity in treatment
effects."').
41. See FDA, STRUCTURED APPROACH TO BENEFIT-RISK ASSESSMENT IN DRUG REGULATORY
DECISION-MAKING 1, 1 (Feb. 2013) (recognizing that "all drugs have some ability to cause adverse
effects").
42. E.g., FDA, BENEFIT-RISK ASSESSMENT IN DRUG REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING: DRAFT
PDUFA VI IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (FY 2018-2022), 1, 3 (2018) ("Simply put, for a drug to be
approved for marketing, FDA must determine that the drug is effective and that its expected benefits
outweigh its potential risks to patients.").
43. See generally Lietzan, Access Before Evidence, supra note 23, at 1297-98.
44. FDA, STRUCTURED APPROACH, supra note 41, at 9 ("Although drug regulatory decisions
are informed by an extensive body of evidence on the safety and efficacy of a proposed product, in
many cases, FDA must draw conclusions from imperfect data.").
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the real world, patients may have other diseases and conditions, are more
biologically heterogeneous, and may take other medicines.45 Also, premarket
testing involves administration of the experimental medicine to fewer people and
for less time than would happen in the real world.46 As a result of these and other
limitations, the risks and benefits of a new medicine may turn out to be different
than suggested by premarket testing. Some adverse reactions could be more
frequent or more severe than expected. Some may have been too rare to emerge in
clinical trials, and some might emerge only after long-term use.47 The medicine
may be less effective or ineffective in patient groups that were not included in the
trials.48
Approval really means only that the data gathered so far show that the
medicine's benefits outweigh its risks.49 There is, therefore, a tradeoff at the heart
of any premarket approval paradigm. On the one hand, although it is impossible to
eliminate all uncertainty about a proposed new medicine, more testing will
generally provide more certainty. On the other hand, additional testing delays the
regulatory decision, and thus market entry. If the regulator still approves the
medicine at the end, the additional testing delayed access to a medicine with a
positive benefit-risk ratio. Patients who could have benefitted from the medicine
had to wait. And if the medicine treated a serious or life-threatening disease, some
patients may have missed the opportunity to use the medicine.50
45. E.g., id. at 9 (noting that trials are designed to show the benefit of a medicine compared
with a control and that some patients may be "excluded to improve the ability to detect a benefit that
can be attributed to the drug"). See generally Kravitz, supra note 40.
46. Frieden, supra note 38, at 465 (noting various limitations of randomized controlled trials,
including that they have limited duration and sample size).
47. Eg., Comm. on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety Sys., The Inst. of Med., The Future
of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public 1, 106 (Alma Baciu, Kathleen
Stratton & Sheila P. Burke, eds. 2007) ("Safety information can emerge from clinical trials, but rare
events may not surface at all; if they do, it is at a rate so low that one cannot distinguish a drug-caused
event from one expected by chance (background incidence).").
48. E.g., Kravitz, supra note 40, at 667 (By convenience, [randomized controlled trials] are
usually characterized by narrow inclusion criteria and recruitment. Under these conditions, the
heterogeneity of treatment effects may be dramatically underestimated, and even assiduous
investigators can be misled into thinking that their results are more generalizable than they actually
are.").
49. See generally Lietzan, Access Before Evidence, supra note 23, at 1297-98. FDA takes a
"population" approach to assessing benefit-risk, meaning that it focuses on the entire patient
population for whom the medicine will be labeled. See Mark Van Der Laan, Anup Malani & Oliver
Van Der Benbom, Improving the FDA Approval Process (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 580 (2d Series), Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 367, 2011). Approval
therefore includes the possibility of an undesirable outcome, and negative benefit-risk balance, for
any particular individual in the population.
50. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry: new estimates ofR&D costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 23 (2016) (reporting




How much information is enough for a decision on the risk-benefit profile of
a new medicine depends on the relative weight given to two goals: (1) earlier
release of new medicines to patients and (2) reduction of uncertainty about the
effects of those medicines. Scholars, doctors, patients, regulators, and
policymakers may disagree about the tradeoff here.5' A patient facing death may
care more about the cost of delay and less about the risk that a drug is unsafe or
ineffective.52 And the benefit-risk assessment for any particular medicine reflects
value judgments that stray well beyond science-such as how much a particular
side effect matters and how much extending life for a month matters. As FDA says,
these decisions occur "at the intersection of law, science, medicine, policy, and
judgment."53
As a result, the modern medicine approval paradigm is partly paternalistic.54
A medicine may not be sold for use by a patient-even if the benefits exceed the
clinical testing to approval of 96.8 months).
51. For example, there is debate about whether egulators set the evidentiary bar too low for
approval of drugs intended to treat cancer. Regulators often approve these drugs on the basis of trials
using surrogate measurements-such as tumor shrinkage or progression-free survival-because
these measurements are easier and quicker to measure than the true endpoint of interest, overall
survival. Some argue that the association between surrogate outcomes and clinically meaningful
outcomes is weak and that FDA should wait for robust clinical outcomes data, rather than approving
new medicines on the basis of small increases in questionable surrogate measurements. E.g., Robert
Kemp & Vinay Prasad, Surrogate endpoints in oncology: when are they acceptable for regulatory
and clinical decisions, and are they currently overused?, 15 BMC MED., Jul. 21, 2017, at 1; Vinay
Prasad et al., The Strength of Association Between Surrogate End Points and Survival in Oncology:
A Systematic Review of Trial-Level Meta-Analyses, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1389 (2015).
52. See Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion ofIndividual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking:
Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559, 579 (2008) (noting that the risk of approving drugs that turn
out not to be safe and effective may be less concerning to patients facing imminent death, because
delay could be catastrophic); Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the
FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 298 (2000) ("Terminally
ill patients lacking effective conventional treatments confront a risk-benefit determination very
different from that of the general public. Such patients have far greater incentives than the larger
public to gather their own information and to take risks."); Christina Sandefur, Safeguarding the
Right to Try, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 513, 536 (2017) (arguing that "the FDA system presumes that the
public should not have access to medicine until federal officials certify it as both safe and effective
to their satisfaction" but "dying patients face a different risk/benefit calculus than other people").
53. FDA, STRUCTURED APPROACH, supra note 41, at 2.
54. See Richard Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx
and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y & ETHics 741, 758 (2005) ("The implicit paternalism of
allowing FDA supremacy assumes that a distant bureaucracy, which has its own institutional biases,
will be a better guardian of all potential users than the people themselves. It is often said that the
ability to take risks and bear their consequences is one of the marks of a self-reliant population.");
Michael D. Greenberg, Information, Paternalism, and Rational Decision-Making: The Balance of
FDA New Drug Approval, 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 663, 671-76 (2003) (discussing and critiquing
the "regulatory paternalism" of the drug approval process); Marie-Louise Lamau, Le recour au
principe d'autonomie en ethique clinique, 234 REVUE D'ETHIQUE ET DE THEOLOGIE MORALE 63
(2005) (discussing medical paternalism in France).
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risks from the perspective of the patient, and even if avoiding delay is more
important to the patient than knowing more about the drug-until a regulator
agrees to permit it, based on its own assessment of benefits and risks. The approval
paradigm is also utilitarian, because it focuses on maximizing overall welfare.5
The decision to require premarket approval based on evidence that may take a
decade to generate focuses on the needs of the population as a whole.56 It places
the need for high quality evidence over the preferences of individual patients, who
may want access to potentially beneficial medicines before that evidence has been
generated. Policymakers have decided that the public as a whole is better off if
market entry is denied until robust evidence has been produced. The use of controls
in premarket clinical trials similarly places the needs of the study-quality data for
the benefit of future patients-above the needs of any particular patient enrolled
in the study.5 7
II. EARLY ACCESS MECHANISMS WITHIN THE GATEKEEPING FRAMEWORK
Over the last half century, policymakers in France and the United States have
refined the regulatory gatekeeping model as the broader relationship between the
individual and state on matters of personal health has evolved. As a practical
matter, a patient today has access to more personal health information than a
patient fifty years ago, as well as more information about diseases and potential
medical interventions. As a matter of political economy, a patient today has more
influence over laws and public policy relating to his health. And as a legal matter,
a patient today has more decision-making authority over personal health matters,
which can constrain others in the healthcare system-for example, when courts
have recognized "rights" that the government must respect. These developments
are intertwined and linked by a thread: elevation of individual agency and
autonomy in matters of personal health.58 Empowerment of the patient has collided
with the paternalism and utilitarianism of the gatekeeping model, leading to the
55. Utilitarian theory is most associated with the writings of Jeremy Bentham. JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burs &
H.L.AHart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1823). This approachwouldbe considered "rule" utilitarian,
in the sense that it assumes this rule can produce better results (more overall well-being) than any
other approach. A different, also utilitarian, approach would say that greater overall well-being will
be achieved if every individual maximizes his or her own utility.
56. Walker, supra note 20, at 4 ("Regulation of new medical interventions draw on population-
focused rather than individual approaches to ethics-taking account of the potential for harm of
unrestricted access ... and of the opportunity costs should ineffective interventions be approved.").
57. Schtklenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 9 (quoting Anthony Fauci, head of the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases during the AIDS epidemic, that the randomized
controlled trial "routinely asks physicians to sacrifice the interests of their particular patients for the
sake of the study").




refinement of gatekeeping frameworks at the heart of this Article: creation of
mechanisms giving patients access to medicines before approval.59
A. Evolution in the Relationship between Individual and State
Patients have access to more information today. In 1954, only sixty-five
percent of U.S. households owned a television set; today, more than three quarters
of households own a desktop or laptop computer, and seventy-seven percent have
a broadband Internet subscription.60 Patients can use the Internet to access
information about diseases, approved medicines, other types of interventions,
ongoing research, and ongoing clinical trials.61 Significant advances in medicine
have also occurred over the same half century, meaning that the information
available is deeper and richer. Improvements in diagnostic technology have
reshaped our understanding of the human body in both healthy and pathological
states, enhancing our understanding of disease and making possible new areas of
pharmacological intervention.62 Profound advances in genetics, virology, and
immunology have transformed the field of microbiology. And the biotechnology
revolution has worked hand in hand with improved imaging capability and an
explosion in computing capability to revolutionize our understanding of human
disease and our therapeutic options, making possible, for example, molecular
engineering.63 Patients today know more because information technology has
59. Others have recounted the U.S. history in detail. E.g., Lewis A. Grossman, AIDSActivists,
FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of America's Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 687
(2016); Zettler, Implications, supra note 21. To our knowledge, no one has considered the parallels
in French history.
60. U.S. Census Bureau History: Public Broadcasting, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 2015),
https://www.census.gov/history/www/homepagearchive/2015/october_2015.html [https://
perma.cc/R53L-9LHW]; CAMILLE RYAN & JAMIE M. LEWIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTERS AND
INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 (2017), https://www.census.gov/content
/dam/Census/library/publications/20 17/acs/acs-37.pdf [https:// perma.cc/GQQ3-5YK4].
61. The reality of access varies. Some patients own multiple computers and handheld devices,
for example, while others may need to walk to a public library on days they do not work. Some
information-such as reports in peer-reviewed medical and scientific journals-resides behind a
paywall, limiting its access to patients with resources or access through an employer. Some patients
and caregivers have ample time for research, others much less. Some patients have the training to
understand scientific and statistical literature, while others do not.
62. Electron microscopy evolved from permitting rudimentary diagnosis of kidney disease and
tumors in the 1960s to identifying a wide range of subtle cellular changes characteristic of diseases.
Ronald E. Gordon, Electron Microscopy: A Brief History and Review of Current Clinical
Application, in 1180 HISTOPATHOLOGY 119 (Christina E. Day ed., 2014). Since the earliest nuclear
magnetic resonance images of humans were published in the 1970s, the field has undergone dramatic
change-with improvements in hardware (such as the introduction of superconducting magnets and
the invention of phased array radiofrequency coils) as well as the development of a variety of rapid
imaging and contrast enhanced cardiac imaging. Robert R. Edelman, The History of MR Imaging as
Seen through the Pages of Radiology, 273 RADIOLOGY S181 (2014).
63. See generally Ronald Evens & Kenneth Kaitin, The Evolution of Biotechnology and Its
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improved and because there is more information.64
The changing information landscape coincided with a rights revolution that
began in the 1960s.65 The rights revolution included a series of rights-affirming
judicial decisions ranging over a wide field relating to medicine and health-for
example, limiting the grounds on which the government may involuntarily commit
an adult,66 recognizing the rights of prisoners to avoid the unwanted administration
of antipsychotic drugs,67 assuming a right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition,68 and identifying several health-related prerogatives related to
contraception and abortion within a "right to privacy."69 In the late 1970s, a group
of terminally ill cancer patients persuaded a federal court hat the right to privacy
included a right to purchase an unapproved new drug, amygdalin, from sellers in
other countries.70 These decisions embraced autonomy principles, finding that the
Impact on Health Care, 34 HEALTH AFF. 210 (2015).
64. See Grossman, Empowered Consumer, supra note 19, at 639 (citing changes in the "health
information environment" contributing to patient empowerment); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (explaining how information politics fueled movement for patient
autonomy and reform in the doctor-patient relationship). Also, an increase in the prevalence of
chronic disease may be prompting patients to take advantage of the information explosion and insist
on more collaborative long-term relationships with their doctors. See JANINE BARBOT, LES MALADES
EN MOUVEMENT: LA MEDECINE ET LA SCIENCE A L'EPREUVE DU SIDA (2002); SEBASTIEN
DALGALARRONDO, SIDA: LA COURSE AUX MOLECULES (2004).
65. The rights revolution included legislative changes as well as the judicial decisions noted in
text. Max N. Helveston, Judicial Deregulation of Consumer Markets, 36 CARDOzo L. REv. 1739,
1745 (2015) ("Large legislative expansions of consumers' rights occurred in the 1960s and
early 1970s, which saw the enactment of statutes like the Consumer Product Safety Act, the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, and state consumer protection acts.").
66. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) ("[A] State cannot constitutionally
confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.").
67. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) ("The forcible injection of medication
into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.").
68. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) ("It cannot be disputed that
the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment.").
69. Eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
70. The resulting injunction did not survive appeal, however, and the Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the trial court's view of the privacy cases. FDA had asserted that Laetrile (amygdalin) required
premarket approval, which meant that the plaintiffs could not receive shipments of the compound
from sources outside the United States. In 1977, a federal district court ruled that Laetrile qualified
for a statutory exemption from the approval requirement. It also ruled in the alternative that FDA's
decision-"denying the right to use a nontoxic substance in connection with one's own personal




patient should make the healthcare decisions relating to his or her own body.71
A series of free speech rulings affirmed the right of consumers to receive
information,72 many related to the availability and cost of medical treatments.73
During these same decades, FDA's policies governing the communication of
information about medicines to patients evolved. For example, in the 1970s the
agency permitted companies to advertise their prices directly to consumers.74 In
the 1980s it allowed direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising disclosing the uses of
prescription drugs.75 And in the 1990s it issued guidance paving the way for DTC
broadcast advertising.76 These developments made it possible for patients to
Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977). After the Supreme Court reversed the statutory ruling, United States
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), the Tenth Circuit declined to consider the constitutional
argument, writing that the privacy cases protect "the decision by the patient whether to have a
treatment or not," but that "his selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication, is within
the area of governmental interest in protecting public health." Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d
455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980).
71. Grossman, Empowered Consumer, supra note 19, at 637 ("One important aspect of the
rights revolution that blossomed in the 1970s was the notion of 'patients' rights."'). Although the
patients' rights movement came of age in the 1970s, the notion that patients' rights play a role in law
is much older. Eg., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("[E]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body .... ").
72. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)
(holding that protection of speech is afforded "to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both").
73. E.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (reversing conviction of Virginia newspaper
editor for printing an advertisement from an organization in New York that would help women locate
clinics and hospitals in New York for low-cost abortions); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
748 (1976) (holding that state bans on advertising prescription drug prices violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (finding that
federal law that prohibited advertising and promotion of compounded medicines violated the First
Amendment); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that
FDA's restrictions on use of textbooks and journal reprints to promote unapproved uses of approved
drugs violated the First Amendment), vacated sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d
331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating on mootness grounds because government changed its interpretation
of the statutory provisions); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (construing
the misbranding provisions of the drug statute as "not prohibiting and criminalizing the truthful off-
label promotion of FDA-approved prescription drugs," in order to avoid construction that "would
unconstitutionally restrict free speech"); Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding manufacturer likely to succeed on the merits of claim that the threat of
enforcement action chilled it from sharing information with doctors about an unapproved use of its
drug).
74. Reminder Labeling and Reminder Advertisements for Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg.
58,794 (Dec. 18, 1975).
75. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50
Fed. Reg. 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985). FDA had not banned this advertising, but companies had generally
refrained. After two advertisements ran in 1983, FDA called for a moratorium to consider the rules
that should apply. It withdrew the moratorium in 1985.
76. Guidance for Industry on Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 64
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assume a greater role in decisions about their own care, though some believe that
DTC advertising needs greater oversight.7 7 The agency now requires that some
prescription drugs have labeling for patients, in addition to the usual labeling for
prescribers.8 A district court rejected the argument that patient labeling for
estrogen interfered with the practice of medicine,79 reflecting a cultural shift away
from medical paternalism.80
Similar changes affected the relationships of patients in France to their
healthcare providers and to the state, but these changes came later in time and were
more limited in scope. Patient groups in France grew more empowered, especially
during the AIDS crisis of the 1990s."F A rights revolution, embracing patients'
rights, occurred in France as it did in the United States. But because France is a
civil law country, not a common law country, the rights revolution has mainly
taken the form of statutory changes. In 2002, a Patients' Rights Law profoundly
changed the relationship between a patient and his or her doctor, laying out the
patient's rights and the doctor's responsibilities, and reforming malpractice
Fed. Reg. 43,197 (Aug. 9, 1999). These advertisements were already legal, but it had been unclear
how to comply with the agency's advertising regulations in the new medium. The guidance explained
how, effectively making the advertisements possible.
77. See Grossman, Empowered Consumer, supra note 19, at 657-62 (discussing emergence of
direct-to-consumer advertising in connection with patients becoming active participants in their own
treatment decisions); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 1, 16 (2002) ("[A]bout
8.5 million consumers received a prescription after viewing a DTC advertisement and asking their
physician for the drug in 2000."); Bo Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Role ofDirect-to-Consumer
PharmaceuticalAdvertising i  Patient Consumerism, 15 AMA J. OF ETHICS 960, 960 (2013) (arguing
that "the lack of firm regulatory guidelines governing" direct-to-consumer advertising "may lead to
suboptimal treatment decisions and health and economic outcomes"). The information revolution has
also facilitated the spread of misinformation about medicine and disease. Erin Connolly, Cleaning
Up "Fake News" in Health Care, MEDICAL BAG (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www. medicalbag.com/home/more/ethics/cleaning-up-fake-news-in-health-care
[https://perma.cc/7TJY-7A8E].
78. Grossman, Empowered Consumer, supra note 19, at 652-57 (discussing patient labeling
requirements introduced in the 1970s).
79. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd per
curiam, 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Grossman, Empowered Consumer, supra note 19, at
653-54.
80. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991) (discussing transformation in the
practice of medicine in the United States due in part to the redefinition of the role of the physician
and the rejection of paternalism).
81. Paul Veron & Frangois Vialla, De quelques difficultds entourant l'action de groupe en
matiere de sante, 127 REVUE LAMY DROIT DES AFFAIRES 45 (2017); Philippe Amiel, Les associations
de patients et la recherche clinique acaddmique et industrielle, 199 BULLETIN DE L'ACADEMIE
NATIONALE DE MEDECINE 589 (2015) (discussing the growth of the patients' rights movement in




liability for doctors.82 While the seminal U.S. litigation relating to the right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition concluded in 1990,83 France did not enact
legislation governing palliative care and giving individuals the choice to refuse life
support measures until 2005.84 And the French courts grappled with the issue only
last year, when a patient injured in a motorcycle accident received life support for
years without brain activity.8 5 Finally, although patients in France today have more
information, a greater sense of autonomy, and a more egalitarian relationship with
their doctors than did their counterparts fifty years ago, they have less
comparatively than patients in the United States today.86
B. Access to Investigational Medicines through a Gatekeeper
In both countries, the shifting relationship between patients and the state put
pressure on the gatekeeping model for new medicines.87 Policymakers responded
82. Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et a la qualite du systeme de
sante, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar.
5, 2002, p. 4118. See generally Florence G' Sell-Macrez, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in
France, Part I: The French Rules of Medical Liability since the Patients' Rights Law of March 4,
2002, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1093 (2011). Historically, the relationship between a patient and private
physician was governed by contract (and liability under the contract was governed by the Civil Code),
while the relationship between a patient and physician in a public hospital was governed by
"administrative" (public) law. Cf GERARD M METEAU, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITE MEDICALE
(1996); Ren6 Savatier, La responsibilite medicale en France (aspects de droit prive), 28 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPAR 493 (1976). But the 2002 law created a new unified scheme for
medical malpractice liability. See G'Sell-Macrez, supra. French prosecutors had also sometimes
brought criminal charges against healthcare professionals in the past. For example, they took action
in the 1850s after physicians investigating the contagiousness of secondary syphilis had "inoculated"
a non-syphilitic ten-year-old boy with pus taken from a patient suffering from secondary syphilis.
See Alex Dracoby, Ethics and Experimentation on Human Subjects in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
France: The Story of the 1859 Syphilis Experiments, 77 BULL. HIST. MED. 332, 360-61 (2003)
(describing the trial of Antoine Gailleton and Joseph-Frederic Guyenot).
83. See Cruzanv. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
84. Loi 2005-370 du 22 avril 2005 relative aux droits des malades et a la fin due vie, J.O., Apr.
23, 2002, p. 7089; see Antoine Baumann et al., Ethics review: End-of-life legislation the French
model, 13 CRITICAL CARE 204 (2009) (explaining that the new law "authorizes the withholding or
withdrawal of treatments when they appear 'useless, disproportionate or having no other effect than
solely the artificial preservation of life"').
85. See Aurelien Breeden, French Court Clears Way to End Life Supportfor Man in Vegetative
State, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/world/europe/france-
vincent-lambert-life-support.html [https://perma.cc/8NCG-T2HF]; see also Aline Cheynet de
Beauprd, Entre la vie et la mort : juger la fin de vie, 3 LES CAHIERS DE LA JUSTICE 413 (2017)
(discussing recent changes to the 2005 law); Paul Veron & Frangois Vialla, Arret des traitements :
deux premidres applications de la loi du 2 fevrier 2016, 5 L'ACTUALITE JURIDIQUE. DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 301 (2017) (discussing early application of this law).
86. See infra Section 0.
87. Anna B. Laakman, Customized Medicine and the Limits of Federal Regulatory Power, 19
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 285, 321-22 (2016) ("The rise of an increasingly influential patient
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in part with mechanisms allowing patients access to new medicines before
approval for the commercial market.8
1. Emergence of Early Access Mechanisms
Early access mechanisms emerged during the worst years of the AIDS crisis
and responded to the fact that better informed and newly empowered patients were
willing to take greater risks in exchange for earlier access to new medicines. In the
United States, however, policymaking discussions also included proponents of
deregulation-groups who opposed gatekeeping altogether, on philosophical
grounds.
Even before the AIDS crisis, FDA had permitted seriously ill patients access
to experimental drugs.8 9 The agency proposed formalizing early access in 1983,
two years after the first major news coverage of AIDS. 90 FDA called the
mechanism a "treatment IND." 91 Recent scholarship has argued persuasively that
empowerment movement has forced the FDA to significantly revise its review and approval
processes.").
88. Policymakers also responded with mechanisms that moved the market entry decision
earlier in time. A few examples follow. The French "fast track" program reduces the timeline for
regulatory approval of clinical trials for certain important medicines. ANSM, CLINICAL TRIALS ON
MEDICINAL PRODUCTS SUBMITTED TO THE ANSM AS PART OF THE FAST TRACK PROCEDURE, Oct. 10,
2018, https://www.ansm.sante.fr/var/ansmsite/storage/original/application
/42df327468624f1ce1862ef562c1cc30.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJU6-GS7A]. U.S. law permits
accelerated approval of a medicine intended for treatment of serious or life-threatening illness, based
on data that do not show clinical benefit but rather predict it. 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (2020). European
law permits a one-year renewable "conditional marketing authorization"-before comprehensive
clinical data have been generated-for certain medicines intended to treat a seriously debilitating or
life-threatening disease. Regulation 726/2004, supra note 22, at 10; Commission Regulation No.
507/2006 of 29 March 2006 on the Conditional Marketing Authorisation for Medicinal Products for
Human use Falling Within the Scope of Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament
and of the Council, 2006 O.J. (L 92) 6, 8 (EC). See generally Jorge Martinalbo et al., Early Market
Access of Cancer Drugs in the EU, 27 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 96 (2016) (describing conditional
marketing authorization, authorization under exceptional circumstances, and accelerated assessment
in Europe). French law similarly provides for conditional approval of medicines. CODE DE LA SANTE
PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. R.5121-36-1 (Fr.).
89. See generally Grossman, AIDS Activists, supra note 59, at 699-700 (describing single
patent exceptions, compassionate use INDs, open label INDs, and the "Group C" program under
which the National Cancer Institute furnished investigational cancer drugs to physicians before their
approval); see also Greenberg, AIDS, supra note 52, at 316 (describing compassionate use INDs
before the AIDS crisis); Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 150 (describing the Group C
program).
90. Lawrence K. Altman, Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1981,
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/03/us/rare-cancer-seen-in-41-homosexuals.html [https://
perma.cc/8XF9-WKHE]; see Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product
Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720 (June 9, 1983).
91. When a company requests permission to perform clinical trials, it submits an




the proposal was an attempt to partially dismantle the premarket gatekeeping
mechanism, advanced by conservatives and libertarians in positions of influence
during the Reagan Administration.92 At one point FDA even proposed shifting the
burden to the agency to reject requests for access.93 The AIDS crisis exploded on
the heels of this proposal, however, and many AIDS advocates who sought early
access nevertheless supported the basic premarket approval paradigm, rejecting
any hint of a lower standard of proof for drugs intended to treat AIDS. 94 With their
influence, the final rule was more moderate.95
In subsequent years, critics complained that FDA's approach to providing
early access lacked clear criteria and submission requirements, leading to
inconsistent policies, inequitable access, and preferential access for some
categories of patients.96 Policymakers and courts also continued to hear arguments
for early access that combined patient empowerment rhetoric with arguments from
rights-based jurisprudence. In 2003, for instance, Abigail Alliance-a public
interest group named after a young woman who died of cancer after being denied
access to an experimental medicine-asked FDA to permit the commercial sale of
drugs after phase 1 trials, contingent on continued progress toward approval.97 It
that although the medicine was experimental, the purpose of the use was treatment rather than
experimentation.
92. Grossman, AIDSActivists, supra note 59, at 701.
93. Id. at 702-04. FDA also proposed allowing companies to charge for the drugs. See
Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and
Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 8,850 (Mar. 19, 1987) (permitting companies to charge for investigational
medicines but allowing FDA to withdraw permission for sale if the price was "manifestly unfair").
94. Grossman, AIDSActivists, supra note 59, at 706 (arguing that accelerated approval on the
basis of surrogate, rather than clinical, endpoints was controversial within the AIDS community,
because it seemed to embrace a lower standard of proof for commercial distribution); id. at 714
(pointing out that AIDS activists focused on "bodily freedom" and used the rhetoric of "choice"
rather than unrestricted experimentalism). In addition to influencing the development of accelerated
approval, AIDS activists played a role in the development of a "parallel track" early access
mechanism specific to HIV/AIDS drugs. Id. at 718-26; Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 149-
50. The parallel track program was meant to enable AIDS patients to enroll in uncontrolled parallel
studies, once promising new AIDS drugs began enrollment for Phase 2 trials. See Expanded
Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People with
AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (Apr. 15, 1992). It has not been used
much; as of 2005, only one drug (stavudine) had been made available through parallel track. Zettler,
Implications, supra note 21, at 150.
95. Grossman, AIDSActivists, supra note 59, at 693. See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (May 22,
1987).
96. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,149
(Dec. 14, 2006) (noting the criticisms). For example, some argued that physicians in academic
medical centers tended to be more aware of FDA's early access policies and procedures and that
patients treated outside of these centers were therefore unlikely to have access. Id.
97. Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 154. By then Congress had also enacted provisions
broadly describing expanded access to investigational drugs for treatment use. Food and Drug
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then turned to the courts, arguing that the U.S. Constitution provides a right of
access to experimental drugs and asking the court to enjoin FDA from preventing
the sale of investigational drugs to terminally ill patients.98 Although Abigail
Alliance lost its case,99 FDA revised its regulations to clarify its early access
scheme and improve access, and the resulting "expanded access" regulations
remain in place today.100
The French history is different, reflecting pressure from patient groups during
the AIDS crisis, but no broader movement to eliminate the gatekeeper. There was
no legislative basis for access to unapproved medicines before 1992.101 Patients
who had enrolled in clinical trials could sometimes continue treatment while the
marketing application was pending, but other patients could not access the
unapproved medicine.10 2 As in the United States, during the early years of the
AIDS crisis patient groups pressed for changes that would allow them medicines
still in trials.103 In 1990, two years after enactment of the first comprehensive
French law governing clinical trials, 0 4 the government decreed that a company
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 402 (1997) (adding section 561
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb). And it had directed the National
Institutes of Health to establish a publicly accessible registry listing ongoing clinical trials of drugs
for serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions. Id. § 113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)).
98. Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 154-55. Private litigation to force companies to
provide access has mostly failed, no matter the legal theory. Shah & Zettler, supra note 21, at 152-
63 (providing an overview of efforts to obtain access through litigation and noting only one
successful contractual claim, which was grounded in an express promise, in Dahl v. HEM
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993)); cf William M. Janssen, A "Duty" to Continue
Selling Medicines, 40 AM. J. L. & MED. 330 (2014) (reviewing and dismissing theories for a legal
duty to continue selling a medicine once that medicine has been made available, such as a common
law duty to initiate a rescue or continue a rescue once initiated). Nor do U.S. or European regulators
have any basis to order companies to provide early access. E.g., Expanded Access to Investigational
Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,150 ("under its existing authority, FDA cannot compel
a drug manufacturer to provide access to investigational drugs for treatment use").
99. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
100. Charging for Investigational Drugs Under an Investigational New Drug Application, 74
Fed. Reg. 40,872 (Aug. 13, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312, subpart I).
101. Quiterie de Launet, Agnes Brouard & Christian Doreau, Les autorisations temporaires
d'utilisation (ATU): 50 ans d'histoire de l'dvolution de la reglementation des medicaments en France,
341 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA PHARMACIE 47, 49 (2004).
102. Id.
103. Id. Groups like Act Up Paris mobilized to gather and share information about the disease
and potential treatments, and eventually prominent patient advocates secured seats at the table with
government researchers. DIDIER LESTRADE, ACT UP: UNE HISTOIRE (2000).
104. Loi 88-1138 du 20 decembre 1988, dite loi Huriet, relative a la protection des personnes
qui se pretent a des recherches biomedicales, J.O., Dec. 22, 1988, p. 16025. The Loi Huriet provided
a legal framework for clinical trials in France, including the ethical principles of informed consent
that apply, and it thus addressed the reluctance of French regulators to authorize trials as well as the
liability concerns of doctors and companies-reluctance and concerns that trace their legacy to the




could in some cases sell investigational medicines to patients unable to enroll in
trials.05 Legislation enacted in 1992 added a new section to the Public Health
Code, largely tracking the decree.106 Further reflection on the AIDS crisis led to
later proposals for mechanisms that would allow wider and faster access to
unapproved medicines.0 7 The resulting law, passed in May 1996, amended the
Public Health Code and created the "temporary authorization for use" (ATU)
framework in place today.108
2. Commitment o the Gatekeeping Model
In both countries, early access requires the approval of a regulator. This
reflects the basic innovation of twentieth century medicines law and the realization
that the public's interest is best served when scientific and public health authorities
have gatekeeping power instead of only the lesser power to take enforcement
action after the fact.109 The standards are similar, reflecting the common themes
and origins of the two medicine approval systems. Expanded access in the United
States requires a showing that (1) the patient has a serious or immediately life-
threatening disease or condition for which there is no comparable or satisfactory
alternative therapy; (2) the potential benefit for the patient(s) justifies the potential
risks,"0 and the potential risks are not unreasonable in the context of the disease
biomedicales, 2009 RECUEIL DALLOZ 1150.
105. Ddcret 90-872 du 27 septembre 1990 portant application de la loi Huriet, J.O., Sept. 29,
1990, p. 11862, 11868.
106. Loi 92-1279 du 8 decembre 1992, modifiant le livre V du code de la sante publique et
relative a la pharmacie et au medicament, J.O., Dec. 11, 1992, p. 16888, 16891 (adding § L.601-2 to
the Public Health Code).
107. de Launet, supra note 101, at 51.
108. Loi 96-452 du 28 mai 1996, portant diverses mesures d'ordre sanitaire, sociale et statutaire,
J.O., July 6, 1996, p. 7912, 7913. The provisions now appear in Article L.5121-12 of the Public
Health Code.
109. Both countries grant most requests, but each denies some. See Jonathan P. Jarow et al.,
Expanded Access of Investigational Drugs: The Experience of the Center of Drug Evaluation and
Research Over a 10-Year Period, 50 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 705 (2016) (indicating
that FDA rejected roughly thirty-two requests for expanded access between 2005 and 2014). The fact
that a regulator generally approves applications for early access does not mean the gatekeeping
function is meaningless. First, the approval may follow back-and-forth about appropriate dosing and
regimen, among other things. Steve Usdin, FDA to Facilitate Access to Unapproved Drugs,
BIOCENTURY (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.biocentury.com/article/299854 /how-fda-plans-to-help-
patients-get-expanded-access-to-unapproved-drugs [https://perma.cc/2TU7-QCJU]. Second,
marketing applications are also generally approved, and few would argue the preapproval authority
is meaningless. Gatekeeping is powerful because it shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking to
make a medicine available, it ensures the standard is met before the medicine is made available, and
it makes enforcement easier for the government. See supra Section 0.
110. When weighing the benefits and risks, FDA will consider the rationale for the intended use
of the drug, the criteria for patient selection, pharmacology and toxicology information showing the
drug is reasonable safe at the dose intended, and the clinical procedures, laboratory tests, and
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being treated; and (3) providing the drug will not interfere with clinical trials that
could support marketing approval."' In France, the ANSM provides temporary
authorization for use, for a limited time and subject to renewal, if (1) the medicine
is intended to treat a rare or serious condition, (2) there is no suitable alternative,
and (3) there is a presumption of safety and effectiveness."2 In both countries these
general criteria apply to every request for early access, and additional standards
must be satisfied depending on whether access will be provided to an individual or
a group of patients.
Both countries permit early access for individual patients. In the United States,
the general criteria for expanded access must be satisfied, and (1) the treating
doctor must determine that the probable risk to the patient from the drug is not
greater than the probable risk from the disease, and (2) FDA must determine that
the patient cannot obtain the drug any other way (for instance, by enrolling in a
clinical trial)."1 3 The agency ordinarily looks for completed phase 1 trials at doses
similar to those proposed for the patient, together with preliminary evidence
suggesting effectiveness."4 In some cases, however, FDA will permit a single
patient access based on preclinical (animal) data or even mechanism of action.15
In France, the ANSM will issue a "nominative" ATU at the request of a doctor, if
the basic criteria for ATUs are met, and (1) the patient cannot participate in clinical
trials, and (2) the benefits to the patient are expected to outweigh the risks."1 6
Generally the ANSM requires that there be a submitted or pending application for
marketing approval, or at least an ongoing clinical trial in France, but it may make
exceptions.17 Both agencies approve these single-patient requests rapidly: often
monitoring planned. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305 (2020).
111. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2020).
112. Autorisations temporaries d'utilisation, ANSM, https://www.ansm.sante.fr/Activites
/Autorisations-temporaires-d-utilisation-ATU/Qu-est-ce-qu-une-autorisation-temporaire-d-
utilisation/(offset)/1 [https://perma.cc/EGW9-YFUC]; see generally CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE
[PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. L.5121-12 (setting rules governing use for therapeutic purposes of
medicines without marketing authorization in France); ANSM, NOTICE TO APPLICANTS FOR
MARKETING FOR TEMPORARY AUTHORISATION FOR USE (ATU) (July 2015) (hereinafter ATU
NOTICE); see also Directive 2001/83, supra note 22, at 74 ("A Member State may, in accordance with
legislation in force and to fulfil special needs, exclude from the provisions of this Directive medicinal
products supplied in response to a bona fide unsolicited order, formulated in accordance with the
specifications of an authorised health-care professional and for use by an individual patient under his
direct personal responsibility.").
113. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a) (2020).
114. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,151
(Dec. 14, 2006).
115. Id.
116. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 1.1.
117. Id. at § 1.1. Indeed, the ANSM may grant access to an unapproved medicine in a desperate
case even if the company is not performing clinical trials to support approval. CODE DE LA SANTE




within hours and at most within a few days.""
Widespread use in the United States requires a "treatment IND" or "treatment
protocol.""I 9 The ordinary standards for expanded access apply. If the medicine is
intended to treat a serious disease or condition, FDA will look for data from phase
3 trials showing safety and effectiveness, but in some cases it will accept
compelling data from phase 2 trials.20 If the medicine is intended to treat an
immediately life-threatening disease, FDA will consider whether "the available
scientific evidence, taken as a whole, provides a reasonable basis to conclude that
the investigational drug may be effective for the expanded access use and would
not expose patients to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury. "121
This will "ordinarily consist of clinical data from phase 3 or phase 2 trials," but it
could comprise "more preliminary clinical evidence."22 Widespread use in France
requires a "cohort ATU" proposed by the company developing the drug.12 3 The
general standards for ATUs apply. Unlike FDA, though, the ANSM also expects
the medicine to be the subject of a pending or imminent marketing application.24
(In this regard, the cohort ATU differs from a nominative ATU, which may be
issued earlier in the life of an investigational medicine and can last for years.) This
means that "early access" via the cohort ATU in France may not be as early in a
particular medicine's research and development timeline as "early access" via
treatment INDs in the United States. The industry reports that new medicines
become available through the ATU mechanism in France roughly 210 days earlier
than they otherwise would become available.2 5 The cohort ATU also contains
much of the same information as a full-blown marketing application, including
118. E g., Lesley R. Navin, DDI Webinar Series: An Overview of FDA's Expanded Access
Process and the New Individual Patient Expanded Access Application, FDA 40, https://
www.fda.gov/media/98959/download [https://perma.cc/BT59-9TWM]; ATU NOTICE, supra note
112, at § 5.2.
119. 21 C.F.R. § 312.320 (2020). Use will fall under a treatment IND if it is organized by an
entity separate from the drug company (which will need the company's cooperation). Otherwise use
falls under a treatment protocol that the company adds to its file at FDA.
120. 21 C.F.R. § 312.320(a)(3) (2020).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See generally CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. L.5121-12 (setting
rules governing use for therapeutic purposes of medicines without marketing authorization in
France); ATU NOTICE, supra note 112; Regulation 726/2004, supra note 22, at art. 83.
124. A company submits its cohort ATU application when it submits its marketing application
or, in some cases, before the marketing application (provided that it files the marketing application
within a fixed period of time). ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 6.1; see also Regulation 726/2004,
supra note 22, at art. 83.
125. LES ENTREPRISES DU MEDICAMENT, CHANTIER 3: L'EVALUATION ET L'EFFICACITE
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draft labeling for the final product and the analytical, preclinical, and clinical data
that will ultimately support approval.12 6
Unlike the ANSM, FDA will also permit expanded access for an
"intermediate-size" population.2 7 The agency explains that this may be necessary
if patients cannot participate in ongoing trials-because they do not meet
enrollment criteria, because enrollment has ended, or even because the trial site is
not geographically accessible.128 The regulations also describe use of this
arrangement when a drug is not under development at all-for instance, because
the disease is so rare that the sponsor cannot recruit trial subjects.129 For
intermediate-size groups to enjoy early access, the ordinary standards for expanded
access must be met. In addition, there must be (1) enough evidence of safety to
justify a clinical trial at the same dose and duration in the same number of people,
and (2) preliminary clinical evidence of effectiveness, or of a plausible
pharmacologic effect, sufficient to make expanded access use a reasonable
therapeutic option for the patients.130 French law has no equivalent scheme.
These early access mechanisms resonate with the shifting relationship
between the individual and the state. Arguments for early access grounded in
autonomy principles tended to reason that individuals should have access to
medicines of their choosing provided that they are fully aware of the risks and
choosing freely.131 Rights-based jurisprudential arguments similarly focused on
the notion that individual rights should rarely be subordinated to the interests of
the larger society.132 Various scholars have pointed out, however, that limiting
early access to patients with serious or life-threatening conditions is hard to square
with these rationales.133 After all, if the autonomy principle applies, it surely
justifies early access for all patients and not simply the dying.134 Moreover, some
126. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 6.1.
127. 21 C.F.R. § 312.315 (2020).
128. 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(2) (2020).
129. 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(1) (2020). Unlike U.S. law, though, Frenchlaw permits use of the
ATU for medicines that treat not only serious diseases but rare diseases. ATU NOTICE, supra note
112, at § 1.1.
130. 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(b) (2020).
131. See Schklenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 10 (discussing this argument).
132. Manik Chahal, Off-trial Access to Experimental Cancer Agents for the Terminally Ill:
Balancing the Needs ofIndividuals and Society, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 367, 368 (2010) ("Though risk is
evident, according to rights-based theory, competent erminal patients should have the right to choose
for themselves what risks they are willing to take, and what actions make life worth living for them.")
133. E.g., Raus, supra note 20, at 1, 7 (identifying and responding to autonomy rationale).
134. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1352 (arguing that if expanded access is grounded in an
autonomy rationale there is no basis for distinguishing between terminally ill patients and other
patients); see also Caplan, Sound Public Policy, supra note 20, at 2 (arguing that the ethical case for
access does not single out the terminally ill as a class deserving of special standing). And, of course,
it can be difficult to reach consensus about what exactly constitutes a life-threatening or terminal




point out that the autonomy rationale may be hard to square with the imposition of
any gatekeeping mechanism at all. 35 These are fair points, and indeed some who
argue from the autonomy rationale would eliminate the gatekeeper altogether.136
That the expanded access and ATU schemes do not align perfectly with the
autonomy rationale suggests that policymakers considered other p inciples. The
next two subsections explain how the early access schemes in France and the
United States reflect additional competing principles.
3. Rigorous Assessment of Informed Consent and Medical Paternalism
In bioethics, informed consent is consent to a medical intervention, freely
given, based on a complete understanding of the intervention, its risks and benefits,
and available alternatives.137 Some argue that uncertainty during premarket testing
means that consent is inherently less informed than it would be later.138 Those
arguing from the autonomy principle may respond that a patient can consent to
uncertainty as much as to risk. A more compelling concern might be that the very
patients for whom early access is considered-those with serious or life-
threatening illnesses-may be less likely to give truly informed consent.139 These
patients may be easily swayed by family members who want them to keep fighting,
for example, and they may not be emotionally or intellectually prepared to
on the criteria for classification of a patient as terminally ill and that physicians are "notoriously
poor" at predicting the probability of death).
135. Cf Caplan, SoundPublic Policy, supra note 20, at 2 (arguing that the ethical case for access
does not explain why patients should have to wait for phase 1 trial results); Leonard, supra note 21,
at 1379 (arguing that if a patient's right to control what he puts in his body is the paramount
consideration, there is no basis for requiring any clinical trials or even the prescription requirement).
136. E.g., Epstein, Erosion, supra note 52, at 574 ("Citizens, as autonomous individuals, should
be free to make these decisions for themselves."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis:
Why Voluntary Organizations Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2009)
(suggesting elimination of FDA's gatekeeping role altogether, on autonomy grounds).
137. See Andrea A. Conti, From informed consent to informed dissent in health care: historical
evolution in the twentieth century, 88 ACTA BIOMEDICA 201 (2017) (describing the principle of
informed consent); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care
Cost Containment, 85 IowA L. REv. 261, 267-72 (1999) (providing brief overview of the principle
and history of informed consent).
138. Carrieri, Peccatori & Boniolo, supra note 20, at 68 (noting argument that there is
insufficient information for informed consent). Indeed, some would argue that the uncertainty makes
rational decision-making impossible; see also Schtklenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 14 (noting this
argument).
139. Schfklenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 12 (noting argument hat the dying are unable to
make fully autonomous choices); see also Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical
Issues in Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 279, 284 (2015) (noting
that "most patients do not have the training or experience to evaluate the combined pharmacologic,
clinical, and statistical information on experimental therapies that is available to them" and that
"[r]isk comprehension among the general public is low, is not strongly correlated with self-perceived
ability to understand risk, and may be more impaired in sicker patients").
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understand the risks and benefits.140 Some literature suggests that these patients are
prone to therapeutic optimism-an excess of optimism about an intervention's
potential benefits and a tendency to dismiss the potential for harm.141 Those
arguing from the autonomy principle respond that our regulatory framework views
patients with serious, life-threatening, even terminal illnesses as competent to
enroll in phase 1 and phase 2 clinical trials.14 2 This is true even though these
subjects often suffer from therapeutic misconception-the mistaken belief that the
trial's purpose is to treat their disease.143
Both early access schemes take informed consent seriously. In the United
States, the treating doctor is considered an "investigator" (just like an investigator
in a normal clinical trial), which triggers the duty to ensure review by an
institutional review board (ethics committee), focused on the protection of human
subjects.144 FDA's informed consent regulations also apply, requiring that the
doctor ensure that the patient understands the drug is investigational and that there
may be uncertainty about its safety and effectiveness.14 5 In France, the treating
140. See Malinowski, supra note 21, at 645 (arguing that the terminally ill should be considered
a "vulnerable group" for informed consent purposes).
141. See Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra note 20, at 979; Raus, supra
note 20, at 7.
142. See John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to Health Care, 6
HAST. CTR. REP. 15, 17 (2006) (suggesting these same patients should be able to consent to
administration of the same medicines "in a nonresearch setting under a physician's supervision").
143. Caplan, Sound Public Policy, supra note 20, at 2 ("Some patients enrolled in Phase One
safety studies believe themselves to be involved in therapeutic experimentation. And almost nothing
that any one can do by way of informed consent can disabuse them of this hope."); Monica H.
Schaeffer et al., The Impact of Disease Severity on the Informed Consent Profess in Clinical
Research, 100 AM. J. MED. 261 (1996) (finding that severely ill patients enrolling in phase 1 trials
retain the least information from informed consent documents). In other words, these patients believe
that investigators focus on the goal of treating them, rather than on strict compliance with the protocol
and trial design elements intended to maximize the usefulness and quality of the resulting data. Pat
McConville, Presuming PatientAutonomy in the Face of Therapeutic Misconception, 31 BIOETHICS
711, 712 (2017); Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 169 ("Even when patients are told they are
participating in a research study that is not intended to benefit them personally in any way, patients
tend to exhibit a robust therapeutic misconception."). See also Carrieri, supra note 20, at 68 (noting
arguments against right-to-try laws given "ethical concern of therapeutic misconception").
144. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c) (2020). This review is meant to ensure that the rights and welfare
of human subjects are protected, including by determining that informed consent is obtained in
accordance with and to the extent required by federal requirements. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT USE - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
1, 5 (Oct. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/85675/download [https://perma.cc/6FVZ-MPN6]
(hereinafter EXPANDED ACCESS GUIDANCE). FDA has detailed regulations governing institutional
review boards, including their organization, their functions and manner of operation, and the records
and reports they must keep. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 56 (2020).
145. FDA, EXPANDED ACCESS GUIDANCE, supra note 144, at 6. These detailed regulations cover
general requirements for informed consent, exceptions from these requirements, the elements of




doctor must similarly confirm that the patient has provided informed consent.14 6
And although both legal systems envision consent involving the patient or, if
appropriate, the patient's legally authorized representative, French law also allows
every patient to designate a trusted person ("personne de confiance") to help with
medical decisions.14 7
Although both early access schemes assume that seriously ill and dying
patients can make informed decisions about risk and benefit, they are paternalistic
in the sense that the regulator plays a direct role in treatment decisions for
individual patients.148 When an individual patient seeks early access in the United
States, FDA considers that patient's disease, medical history, and prior
treatments.14 9 It compares the benefits and risks for that patient, and it could in
theory reach a different decision than the doctor and patient.50 The French
regulator similarly considers the benefits and risks for individual patients who seek
early access. FDA and the ANSM have a more paternalistic role with respect to
early access arrangements than with respect o medicines approved for the market.
When regulators approve a new medicine, they make the benefit-risk call focusing
on the entire intended patient population, and individual treatment decisions are
left to doctors.15' But they oversee individual treatment decisions in early access
arrangements.
4. Prioritizing the Generation of Evidence and Progress Toward Approval
Early access schemes could interfere with the utilitarian goal of the premarket
approval requirement: the generation of high-quality evidence to support market
entry and prescribing decisions.52 A company providing early access spends
146. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 5.5 (nominative ATU); id. at § 6.4 (cohort ATU).
147. CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. L.1111-6; see also HAUTE
AUTORITt DE SANTt, LA PERSONNE DE CONFIANCE (Apr. 2016), https://www.has-sante.fr/upload
/docs/application/pdf/20 16-03/dapersonneconfiancev9.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV39-897Q].
148. Dresser, supra note 21, at 1641-43; Benjamin P. Falit & Cary P. Gross, Access to
Experimental Drugs for Terminally Ill Patients, 300 JAMA 2793, 2793 (2008) ("Minimization of
harm to terminally ill patients is a primary goal of governmentally imposed restrictions on access.").
149. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(b)(2)(iii) (2020).
150. In practice, this rarely happens. See supra note 109.
151. A doctor may prescribe an approved medicine for any use, including a use for which the
medicine is not approved. Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for
Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503 (Aug. 15,
1972) (" [T]he physician may, as part of the practice of medicine, lawfully ... vary the conditions of
use from those approved in the package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval of the
Food and Drug Administration."); CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. R.4127-
8 (Fr.) (providing that, within the limits of current scientific knowledge, a doctor is free to prescribe
the medicine that he considers most appropriate under the circumstances).
152. See Caplan & Moch, Rescue Me, supra note 20 ("In the case of many experimental
therapies, there is a clear and growing moral dilemma which society will ultimately need to address:
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resources that could instead support ongoing clinical trials and a marketing
application. Smaller companies may find it financially prohibitive to supply
patients seeking early access while also supplying and funding clinical trials,
particularly if the manufacturing process is complex or the raw materials
expensive.153 Diverting resources could slow a medicine's progress to approval
and thus delay access for other patients. If the patient seeking early access suffers
from a different disease, diverting resources may delay treatment of patients with
a disease that the medicine is more likely to treat safely and effectively. 5 4
Early access programs may also siphon patients away from trials, interfering
with enrollment. 5 5 This will happen if patients eligible for the trial are also allowed
Do attempts to help individuals in immediate need place at risk the pursuit of evidence-based
regulatory approval that will make a product available as quickly as possible to the largest number
of affected and soon-to-be affected individuals?").
153. Tim K. Mackey & Virginia J. Schoenfeld, Going "Social" to Access Experimental and
Potentially Life-Saving Treatment: An Assessment of the Policy and Online Patient Advocacy
Environment for Patient Access, 14 BMB MED. 17, 20 (2016) (noting that "[l]ogistics for
investigational drug availability are also challenging, since these drugs are typically manufactured in
small lot sizes that can be impacted by manufacturing complications and/or limited availability of
active pharmaceutical ingredient/raw materials"); Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance: The
Reality Behind the Right to Get Experimental Drugs, 56 KAN. L. REv. 1045, 1063 (2008); Michael
Cipriano, Gottlieb's "Right to Try" Sentiment: Law Fails to Address Difficulties Faced by
Drugmakers, PINK SHEET (Jul. 30, 2018), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS123596
/Gottliebs-Right-To-Try-Sentiment-Law-Fails-To-Address-Difficulties-Faced-By-Drugmakers
(noting that then-Commissioner Gottlieb pointed out repeatedly that the problem with right-to-try
was that companies would not make their drugs available and that with cell-based therapies in
particular the "cost of goods isn't trivial"); Kristina Fiore, Desperate Families Pursue "N-of-1"
Trials for Ultra-Rare Diseases, MEDPAGE TODAY (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/special-reports/exclusives/81725 [https://perma.cc/VH3R-FGXS]
(noting that one small company providing early access to a gene therapy product in 2019 reported a
total cost, for four infusions to a single patient, of "hundreds of thousands of dollars").
154. The drug could work in both diseases, to be sure. Abigail Burroughs, for whom the "Abigail
Alliance" organization is named, suffered from head and neck cancer and sought (unsuccessfully)
access to Erbitux (cetuximab), which was being tested for colon cancer. Complaint at 6-7, Abigail
All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, Case No. 1:03cv01601, 2004 WL
3777340 (D.D.C. 2004). And today the medicine is approved for both. Still, evenif the medicine will
work in patients seeking expanded access for a different disease, diverting resources for those patients
may slow access for future patients with the first disease the company chose to study.
155. Whether an early access program will discourage participation in ongoing clinical trials
may depend on the drug, the disease it is meant to treat, alternative treatments in the market, and the
design of the trial. Thousands of patients participated in controlled clinical trials of the lipid-lowering
statins, after their approval, to assess their effect on cardiovascular mortality and morbidity, even
though these patients faced potential randomization to a potentially inferior alternative therapy.
Amicus Brief for Economists John E. Calfee et al. at 14, Abigail All. for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But low enrollment in the
trials of Zidovudine (azidothymidine) in the 1980s suggests that the risk of under-enrollment may be
meaningful if the trials are placebo-controlled, particularly if the disease is serious and otherwise
untreatable. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1361 (noting that patients who were HIV-positive but who




early access, as they may want to avoid the risk of being randomized to the control
group.156 Interfering with enrollment could slow-or even prevent-the
medicine's progress to market. This will delay or prevent access for future patients,
unless those patients also proceed through early access-at which point the
premarket approval requirement would become a sham. Slowing the trials not only
delays approval for future patients, but also delays the production of robust
evidence on which to base treatment decisions.57 Doctors and patients relying on
expanded success during the delay base these decisions on poorer quality
evidence.158
The French and U.S. schemes address these concerns in three ways, although
they differ in the specifics.
First, neither regulator permits early access unless the arrangement will not
threaten the completion of trials designed to support approval of the medicine.
FDA requires that in all cases of expanded access the agency first find that the
proposed use "will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of
clinical trials that could support . .. approval."159 An ATU in France may not
interfere with the trials that would provide "essential, accurate answers" to
questions about the medicine's benefit-risk ratio.160
Second, they partially restrict access to the programs. Limiting an early access
program to patients ineligible for clinical trials prevents the program from
cannibalizing the pool of potential trial participants. But views on this vary. On the
one hand, some suggest equity supports providing early access programs to trial-
otherwise able to obtain AZT and feared placebo in the trial).
156. Although officials at FDA prefer a placebo control where ethically permissible, in the case
of a serious illness patients in a control arm will receive available treatment as a control. Generally
controlled trials are viewed as ethical if there is equipoise, meaning genuine uncertainty regarding
the comparative therapeutic merits of each arm. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of
Clinical Research, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 141 (1987). Patients may nevertheless decline to enroll
due to concerns about receiving an active control rather than the experimental medicine. Menikoff,
supra note 153, at 1063 (2008) (noting concerns about early access programs affecting enrollment
because patients fear randomization); Leonard, supra note 21, at 1361.
157. Vinay Prasad & Vance Berger, Hard-Wired Bias: How Even Double-Blind Randomized
Controlled Trials Can Be Skewedfrom the Start, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1171, 1171 (2015) ("Well-
designed, adequately powered randomized controlled trials ... are rightfully considered the highest
form of evidence on which to base treatment and diagnostic decisions, minimizing potential biases,
particularly confounding, that plague nonrandomized of evidence.").
158. Consider the example of high-dose chemotherapy followed by autologous bone marrow
transplant, which was under investigation for treatment of breast cancer. Patients had access to the
treatment while the trial was underway, not because of an early access program but because FDA
had already approved the chemotherapy agent for another use. This led to low enrollment in the trials,
which delayed the eventual finding that the procedure offered no benefit over less risky alternatives.
Shah & Zettler, supra note 21, at 178-79; see also Dresser, supra note 21, at 1650.
159. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3) (2020).
160. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 1.1.
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ineligible patients, because these patients are denied access to trials through no
fault of their own.161 Some add that, essentially for utilitarian reasons, regulators
must deny early access to patients who could enroll in clinical trials.162 On the other
hand, some have argued that controlled trials are inherently coercive and thus
ethical only if trial-eligible patients may obtain access outside the trials.163 And
sometimes requiring that patients be ineligible for trials is a sham, because eligible
patients can render themselves ineligible.164 This second, more expansive view,
that early access should be open to all, has not prevailed, perhaps because it risks
compromising a medicine's progress to market. Some have also pointed out that
opening early access schemes to all patients can raise equity issues if patients with
greater resources choose early access to avoid the risks of randomization.165 Both
regulators limit single-patient access to trial-ineligible patients. In the United
States, single patients are eligible for early access only if they cannot obtain the
drugs in clinical trials.166 The ANSM will issue an ATU for a single patient only if
that patient cannot participate in a clinical trial.167 For intermediate-size patient
groups, FDA will also entertain arguments that the patients are theoretically trial-
eligible but unable to enroll (for instance, because of geographic proximity to trial
sites and lack of resources, over which they have little control).168 Widespread
early access in both countries is available for patients with the disease that the
company is studying in controlled trials for marketing approval.169
Third, the regulators mitigate the effect of early access on progress to approval
by limiting these arrangements o drugs that are nearly finished with premarket
research and development. French law embraces this solution more than U.S. law
does. The ANSM will not approve a cohort ATU unless the medicine is the subject
of a pending or imminent marketing application.70 In contrast, widespread use
under a treatment IND or treatment protocol in the United States usually requires
ongoing or completed controlled clinical trials, but can be based on more
161. Raus, supra note 20, at 3 (describing the argument).
162. E g., Falit & Gross, supra note 148, at 2794 (arguing that "authorities must deny access to
experimental drugs for patients who are eligible for clinical trials" and "individuals should be
adequately deterred from gaming the system by, for instance, initiating therapy with an alternative
compound that renders them ineligible for a study").
163. Sch klenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 20 (noting argument).
164. Walker, supra note 20, at 11.
165. Cf, Sch klenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 8 (noting argument that i is coercive to require
the terminally ill to risk randomization for the sake of future patients).
166. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a)(2) (2020).
167. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 1.1.
168. 21 C.F.R. § 312.515(a) (2020); see Carrieri, Peccatori & Boniolo, supra note 20, at 66
(suggesting an ethical argument for access in this situation).
169. 21 CFR 312.320(a)(1)(i) (2020); ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 6.1.




preliminary data in appropriate situations.'7 For individuals, both regulators will
permit access well before phase 3 trials, and FDA will do so even based only on
animal testing.7 2 And, again, in the United States, an "intermediate-size" group
can benefit from early access even if the medicine is not being developed at all.173
This is impossible in France.
Limiting early access schemes to patients who are ineligible for trials, or to
drugs that are nearing premarket approval, is hard to square with autonomy
arguments. These limitations reflect instead the influence of utilitarian arguments
that the public's interest in the development of high-quality evidence for proposed
new medicines outweighs any individual interests in earlier access.7 4 The U.S.
expanded access scheme is less limited in these respects than the French ATU
scheme, perhaps reflecting greater policymaking deference to autonomy
arguments. In the end, though, FDA will still refuse access if it will interfere with
trials that could support approval.
Some suggest that the effect of early access on the public's interest can be
partially mitigated by the collection of evidence from early access arrangements,
which can inform the regulator's understanding of the medicine, for the benefit of
other patients. Although views vary on the ethics of using data from early access
for research,75 both schemes require the collection and submission of data. When
an individual patient receives expanded access in the United States, either the
treating doctor or the company must send FDA a written summary of the results.176
171. 21 C.F.R. § 312.320(a)(1) (2020); 21 C.F.R. § 312.320(a)(2) (2020).
172. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 75,151.
For example, in 2019 a 25-year-old woman from Iowa received an experimental antisense
oligonucleotide (ASO) targeted at the gene mutation responsible for her rare form of amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (AL S). The company developing the ASO had completed in vitro and animal testing,
but no trials in humans. Fiore, supra note 153; Stella Daskalakis, Jaci Hermstad Receives Seventh
ASO Infusion as her Mother Honors Her in New York, KTIV.COM (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://ktiv.com/2019/10/23/j aci-hermstad-receives-seventh-aso-infusion-as-her-mother-honors-
her-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/NA7M-QFAA].
173. 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(1) (2020). It is unclear whether expanded access has ever been
provided on this basis. Expanded access is also available if the drug is approved but no longer
marketed, or if the drug contains the same active moiety as an approved but unavailable drug. Id. at
(a)(3).
174. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1343-44; Carrieri, Peccatori & Boniolo, supra note 20, at 68
(noting that early access has "direct negative implications for [randomized clinical trials] and general
public health interests"). Permitting earlier access for the subset of the population with serious
conditions, as both regulators do, also arguably increases overall utility, because this group has a
different risk-benefit radeoff than does the population at large.
175. Walker, supra note 20, at 11-12 (reasoning that early access programs might be ethical if
they contribute to our understanding of the experimental medicines in question); but see Bunnik,
Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra note 20, at 981 (noting disagreement about whether it
is morally acceptable to collect research data within expanded access programs).
176. 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(c)(2) (2020).
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Adverse events must be reported to the agency,"7' and the safety data must be
included in any marketing application submitted.'7 8 Safety data from expanded
access could even support he approval decision.179 The effectiveness data from
expanded access, however, are lower in quality than effectiveness data from
randomized controlled trials, and they might not support-let alone justify-a
finding of effectiveness under the U.S. drug statute.180 In France, patient
monitoring and data collection under an ATU are governed by a protocol for
therapeutic use and information collection, drawn up by the company and the
ANSM."8' The company also has adverse vent reporting obligations.8 2 And with
a cohort ATU, the ANSM receives information about the characteristics of the
patients, the effectiveness of the medicine, and adverse events resulting from its
use.8 3 The company must analyze the medicine's benefit-risk ratio in light of this
information.18 4
III. THE RIGHT-TO-TRY ALTERNATIVE IN THE UNITED STATES
Expanded access in the United States and ATU in France are broadly
consistent with the approach and goals of the new medicine approval paradigm.
They similarly assume that a scientific agency should serve as the gatekeeper-
here, deciding whether a particular patient (or group of patients) may access a
177. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) (2020).
178. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2020) (requiring that an application include a "description
and analysis of any other data or information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness
of the drug product obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source, foreign or
domestic").
179. Approval of Epidiolex (cannabidiol) in 2018 was supported in part by safety data from
nearly 700 patients who received the product through expanded access. Sean M. O'Connor & Erika
Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U.
L. REv. 823, 917-18 (2018). See also Kate Rawson, Expanded Access Data Can Support Approval
Decisions, FDA Says, PINK SHEET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://
pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS 124296/Expanded-Access-Data-Can-Support-Approval-
Decisions-US-FDA-Says (citing other examples).
180. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900, 40,905
(Aug. 13, 2009) ("Because expanded access programs are typically uncontrolled exposure (with
limited data collection), it is very unlikely that an expanded access IND would yield effectiveness
information that would be useful to FDA in considering a drug's effectiveness."); Jan Borysowski,
Hans-Jrg Ehni & Andrzej G6rski, Ethics Review in Compassionate Use, 15 BMC MED., Jul. 24,
2017, at 3 ("Indeed, the value of data collected during the conduct of compassionate use is limited,
especially compared to that of randomized controlled trials, the contemporary gold standard of drug
efficacy and safety studies").
181. CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH CODE] art. R.5121-70; ATU NOTICE, supra
note 112, at § 1.1.
182. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 7.2.2.1, CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [PUBLIC HEALTH
CODE] art. R.5121-166.
183. ATU NOTICE, supra note 112, at § 6.2.




medicine. And their design reflects the premise that the paramount goal of a
medicine regulatory system remains the generation of high-quality evidence to
support a scientific decision on approval for the market. In 2018, the U.S. Congress
passed a law taking a fundamentally different approach.185 The right-to-try law
permits access to unapproved medicines without the prior involvement of FDA,
rejecting the premarket review mechanism that has characterized new medicines
frameworks since the mid-twentieth century in favor of limited post hoc
enforcement power.
A. Elimination of the Gatekeeper
Congress added a new section to the U.S. drug statute, exempting certain
drugs provided to certain patients from the gatekeeping provisions of that statute
and from FDA's regulations implementing those provisions. The patient must be
diagnosed with a life-threatening disease or condition-generally meaning the
likelihood of death is high unless the course of disease is interrupted.186 (In
contrast, expanded access is available when the disease is "serious or immediately
life-threatening," which is broader, because "serious" diseases are included. 187)
The patient must have exhausted approved treatment options and must be unable
to participate in a clinical trial involving the drug.188 The drug itself must be the
subject of a pending marketing application or a clinical trial intended to form the
primary basis of a claim of effectiveness in an application, and it must have
completed phase 1 trials.189 (In contrast, FDA can authorize expanded access at
any time during premarket trials, including phase 1 trials, or even earlier.1 90) If all
these criteria are met, the drug may be provided to the patient.
The federal government does not play a role in determining whether these
conditions are met. Neither the company nor the doctor seeks permission from
FDA.191 If anyone (apart from the company) plays a gatekeeping role, it is state-
licensed doctors. However, FDA must have already given permission for the phase
1 trials, and this limits the pool of permitted compounds to those that the
government has deemed safe enough to test in humans. But a patient exercising
185. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018) (largely codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a).
186. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(A) (2018) (referring to the definition of "life threatening" that
appears in 21 C.F.R. § 312.81)). A disease is also life-threatening if it has a potentially fatal outcome
and the endpoint for preapproval clinical trials is (or in this case, would be) overall survival. 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.81(a)(2) (2020).
187. See supra Section 0. A disease is considered serious if it is associated with morbidity that
has a substantial impact on day-to-day functioning. 21 C.F.R. § 312.300(b) (2020).
188. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B) (2018).
189. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(a)(2) (2018).
190. See supra Section 0.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (2018) (exempting eligible drugs from 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
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the "right to try" does not need to ask the government's permission. Instead, before
the drug can be provided to the patient, a physician in good standing with the
appropriate licensing board must determine that the patient has exhausted
approved treatment options and cannot participate in a clinical trial. (In contrast,
in expanded access situations, FDA makes this determination.192) The right-to-try
law specifies no actor to enforce the other two threshold eligibility requirements-
that the patient's disease is life-threatening, and that the patient provided informed
consent. (In contrast, in expanded access, FDA determines whether the patient's
disease qualifies, holds the investigator responsible for securing informed consent,
and requires ethics committee review.193)
FDA's role here is, at best, after the fact. The agency would have to learn of
the procedure in the first instance and then, believing that the patient had not
provided informed consent or did not suffer from a life-threatening disease, claim
that the patient had not been eligible for right-to-try access. If either is true, the
drug was not exempt from FDA's gatekeeping authorities, and FDA could take
enforcement action. (It would charge the company with introduction of a new drug
into interstate commerce without an approved marketing application or effective
IND.1 94) But the agency will not learn about right-to-try treatments until the
company's annual summary of right-to-try uses, and the statute does not require
those summaries to identify investigators or patients.195 Even if the agency knew
each patient's identity, it is not clear how FDA could conclude that a patient did
not provide informed consent, because the law also says that FDA's regulations on
the protection of human subjects, including the informed consent requirements, do
not apply.196 Presumably FDA would have to find that the relevant state law
standard was met, but a court would not defer to its interpretation of that state law.
So, these limitations may turn out to be a sham.197
192. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(1) (2020) ("FDA must determine that ... there is no comparable
or satisfactory alternative therapy to diagnose, monitor, or treat the disease or condition").
193. Eg., 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(1) (2020) ("FDA must determine that the patient or patients
to be treated have a serious or immediately life-threatening disease or condition .... "); 21 C.F.R. §
3 12.305(c)(4) (2020) (holding the investigator responsible for ensuring informed consent).
194. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018).
195. FDA plans to issue regulations implementing the annual summary requirement. Michael
Cipriano, Expanded Access Program Improving, But Sponsor Concerns Linger, PINK SHEET (Sept.
10, 2019), https://pink.pharnaintelligence.informa.com/PS140818/Expanded-Access-Program-
Improving-But-Sponsor-Concerns-Linger; OMB Reviewing FDA Proposal for Right to Try
Reporting Requirements, FDA WEEK (Apr. 3, 2020).
196. FDA's regulations requiring institutional review board (ethics committee) review also do
not apply. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (2018).
197. To be fair, state law will usually impose its own informed consent obligation on treating
doctors. And it may require that access proceed through the same kind of ethics review as FDA would
have required. See Jeannie Baumann, Experimental Drug Requests Rising Faster Than Previously
Thought, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 18, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com /pharma-and-life-




The right-to-try law also strips FDA of its ability to impose conditions on
access.198 For example, in ordinary expanded access situations, the sponsor f the
trial (usually the drug company) must notify FDA of any serious and unexpected
adverse reaction within 15 days.199 It also notifies investigators working with the
drug. These rules do not apply to drugs made available under right-to-try. The
right-to-try law does require each company's annual summary to identify "any
known serious adverse events,"200 but FDA's detailed adverse event rules do not
apply,2 01 and agency officials believe the data in these annual summaries will be
of low quality.202 FDA's rules relating to maintaining control of the investigational
medicine also do not apply,203 nor do its recordkeeping rules.204 And the agency
has no power to call a halt to the process when patients are subject to unreasonable
risk of injury or when the doctors lack the training and experience necessary to
administer the drug.205
Only three FDA regulations relating to investigational medicines still apply:
a regulation governing labeling,206 a regulation prohibiting promotion,207 and the
regulation limiting how much the company can charge (only the direct costs of
making the medicine available).20 And the agency will have to enforce these rules
requires that an institutional review board review each access request).
198. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (2018) (exempting eligible drugs from sections 502(f),
503(b)(4), 505(a), and 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as well as section 351(a)
of the Public Health Service Act, and parts 50, 56, and 312 of title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations).
199. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c) (2020).
200. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(d)(1) (2018).
201. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32 (2020) (ordinary adverse event reporting framework, which does
not apply).
202. Derrick Gingery, Unlicensed Stem Cell Clinics are 'Surrogate'for Right to Try, US FDA 's
Marks Says, PINK SHEET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com
/PS 124294/Unlicensed-Stem-Cell-Clinics-Are-Surrogate-For-Right-To-Try-US-FDAs-Marks-Says.
203. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 312.61 (2020) ("The investigator shall not supply the investigational
drug to any person not authorized under this part to receive it."), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b)
(2018).
204. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 312.62(a) (2020) ("An investigator is required to maintain adequate
records of the disposition of the drug, including dates, quantity, and use by subjects. If the
investigation is terminated, suspended, discontinued, or completed, the investigator shall return the
unused supplies of the drug to the sponsor, or otherwise provide for disposition of the unused supplies
of the drug"), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (2018).
205. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 312.42(b)(1) (2020), with 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(b) (2018).
206. 21 C.F.R. § 312.6 (2020). This requires that (1) the package label state the drug is limited
to investigational use, and (2) the label and labeling not bear any false or misleading statement and
not represent hat the drug is safe and effective for the purpose for which it is being investigated.
207. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7 (2020). This prohibits (1) representing in a promotional context that the
drug is safe and effective for the purpose for which it is being investigated, (2) commercial
distribution of the drug, and (3) "unduly" prolonging the investigation after generating sufficient data
to support approval.
208. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(1) (2020). There is confusion on this point. E.g., Adam Feuerstein,
37
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
after the fact, when it receives the company's annual summary.
The drug industry did not support the law. 20 9 The law subverts an eighty-year-
old approach to medicine regulation, and its underpinnings may be deeply
uncomfortable for the scientific and regulatory personnel at larger companies that
operate within, understand, and agree with the basic approach to medicines
regulation in this country.2 10 Representatives of the Goldwater Institute insist that
the scheme is being used,21 ' but speakers at a recent conference could identify only
one company using the "right to try."21 2 Many companies have said they will
Here comes the right-to-try profiteers: The FDA is powerless to stop them, STAT NEWS (June 20,
2018), https://www.statnews.con2018/06/20/right-to-try-opportunism [https://perma.cc/8NH2-
TUDK] (stating that medicines can be sold "at a profit" and quoting one CEO who was considering
charging $300,000 per treatment).
209. See Stephen Barlas, "Right-To-Try" Legislation Moving Through Congress, But Drug
Companies and Some Patient Groups Want Changes, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 739, 739
(2017) ("The Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), the trade group that represents many
smaller biopharmaceutical companies, especially those involved inbiologics, also opposes the bill.");
id. at 741 ("Research pharmaceutical companies are not enthusiastic about the bill."); Early Access
Programs: Points to Consider, BIO 2-4 (Apr. 16, 2010),
https ://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/legacy/bioorg/docs/files/20100416.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PVJ-LCQY] ("A patient's right to treatment based on his or her autonomous
decision-making ability does not supersede a company's ethical responsibility to develop and market
safe and effective products as fast as possible .... In some circumstances, ... by allowing early
access, the company risks market approval of the product. Thus, the question often confronting
companies is whether to put an entire project at risk - and therefore jeopardize availability of a drug
for a larger patient population - in order to provide early access to a product for an individual or
small group of patients.")
210. Criticism of the state right-to-try laws and the federal proposal was robust. Rebecca
Dresser, "Right o Try" Laws: The Gap between Experts and Advocates, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9,
9 (2015) ("Scientists and policy experts are virtually unanimous in criticizing right to try laws.");
Christopher Morrison, Critics Say "Right to Try" Wrong for Patients, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
294, 294 (2018) (noting the opposition of "a diverse group" of critics including "many patient
advocacy groups, the biotech industry, and FDA officials").
211. Michael Cipriano, Right to Try Conversation Should be Redirected Toward
Reimbursement of Unapproved Drugs, Experts Say, PINK SHEET (Jan. 29, 2019), https://
pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS 124659/Right-To-Try-Conversation-Should-Be-
Redirected-Toward-Reimbursement-Of-Unapproved-Drugs-Experts-Say (quoting Goldwater
representative that companies are using it).
212. Sue Sutter, Expanded Access Advocates Seek Reimbursement Mandate, Manufacturer
Incentives from Congress, PINK SHEET (Feb. 11, 2020), https://
pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS 141654/Expanded-Access-Advocates-Seek-
Reimbursement-Mandate-Manufacturer-Incentives-From-Congress (noting that "Epitopoietic
Research Corporation has approved 10 requests for access to Gliovac (ERC1671), a cell-based
immunotherapy for glioblastoma multiforma and gliosarcoma," under a right-to-try program). See
also ERC-USA Initiates Therapy Under Right to Try Law with First Patient in California Using







continue to provide experimental medicines under traditional expanded access
programs or simply focus on seeking approval.2 13
B. Explaining the Enactment ofRight-to-Try in the United States
The right-to-try mechanism differs conceptually from the early access
mechanisms in the United States and France. The early access mechanisms assume
that generating high-quality phase 3 data and securing regulatory approval remain
paramount goals, and thus retained the regulator's gatekeeping role. Proponents of
the right-to-try law explicitly rejected this utilitarianism, saying that "the most
troubling argument in favor of the FDA's veto power is that the agency is always
mindful of the effect expanded access may have on the clinical-trial process."21
Its legislative sponsors openly explained that the law was meant to reduce FDA's
power and, instead, empower patients to choose potentially life-saving therapies.215
These arguments suggest hat enactment of the right-to-try law in the United States
can be explained by three things.
First, the United States has a robust history and tradition of valuing personal
autonomy, including autonomy in personal medical decisions. Proponents of the
"right to try" invoked this tradition, putting forward arguments that found their
roots in the writing of John Stuart Mill and Gerald Dworkin-that the state may
interfere with the choices of an autonomous individual only to prevent harm to
others.2 16 The individual, they argued, has a moral right-perhaps a constitutional
right, some argued2 17-to try to save his or her own life. Further, the state cannot
213. Derrick Gingery, Unlicensed Stem Cell Clinics, supra note 202 (noting that Johnson &
Johnson has declined to use right-to-try and that Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics, developing Nurown
for ALS, announced in June 2018 that it would use right-to-try and then changed its mind); Sue
Sutter, Why The Right-to-Try Law is Not Right for Some Biotech Companies, PINK SHEET (June 13,
2018), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS123274/Why-The-RightToTry-Law -Is-Not-
Right-For-Some-Biotech-Companies (noting that Alnylam and Sarepta said they would not use it
because they are focusing on approval).
214. Corieri, supra note 16, at 16.
215. Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson, Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, to Scott Gottlieb, Comm'r, FDA (May 31, 2018),
https://www.hsgac. senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-to-fda-agency-should-comply-with-
right-to-try-law [https://perma.cc/Q3T8-BVJ9] ("[T]his legislation is fundamentally about
empowering patients to make decisions in cooperation with their doctors and the developers of
potentially life-saving therapies . . . [and it] intends to diminish the FDA's power over people's lives,
not increase it.").
216. Corieri, supra note 16, at 21-22; see also Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1705, 1712 (1992) (discussing John Stuart Mill's "harm
principle," that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others" in the context of various
healthcare decisions); see generally JESSICA FLANIGAN, PHARMACEUTICAL FREEDOM: WHY PATIENTS
HAVE A RIGHT TO SELF-MEDICATE (2017).
217. E.g., Volokh, supra note 21, at 1829-30; Corieri, supra note 16, at 21.
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"reasonably demand" to decide what risks an informed and competent individual
may take when facing death.218 Respect for personal autonomy means leaving this
decision to the patient. In the United States, the strong consumer empowerment
movement and a political-legal commitment to the unencumbered flow of
information acclimated patients to a high degree of involvement in their healthcare
decisions. This aligns with the U.S. emphasis on personal autonomy and provided
fertile ground for the right-to-try movement.219
Second, many in the United States favor a reduced role for government,
especially the federal regulatory apparatus. Two strands of thinking are at play
here. To begin with, the federalist system of governance generally reserves to the
states matters relating to medicine and health.220 This leads to skepticism about,
and hostility towards, a federal agency intervening when a state-regulated doctor
decides the best course forward for a patient. The state right-to-try laws trace their
lineage to laws enacted forty years ago, when patients-frustrated with FDA's
failure to approve Laetrile for the treatment of cancer-persuaded the states to
legalize its sale within their borders.221 There is also a robust deregulatory
movement in the United States only tangentially related, if at all, to state's rights.
Thirty years ago during the AIDS crisis, some were prepared to repeal the
effectiveness standard or even eliminate FDA's gatekeeping role altogether.222
Patient groups were divided over the ultimate objective: some merely sought early
access but embraced the goal of full approval under the approval standard, while
others focused on, as one scholar recently put it, getting "drugs into bodies."223 In
the 1990s, the latter groups found common cause with deregulatory forces. The
same thing happened with the right-to-try initiative, the origins of which lie with
the Goldwater Institute, a conservative and libertarian public policy think tank in
Arizona. This organization drafted a model right-to-try law in February 2014,
which it then distributed to the states.22 4 A majority of states passed right-to-try
laws in the years that followed.2 25 The proliferation of state laws snubbing the
218. Sch klenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 11 (describing the argument).
219. The law passed with a "sense of the senate" provision stating that the law "expands the
scope of individual liberty and agency among patients." Pub. L. No. 115-176 § 3, 132 Stat. 1372
(2018).
220. Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L. J. 845 (2018).
221. Grossman, AIDSActivists, supra note 59, at 693.
222. Id. at 712.
223. Id. at 706.
224. Zettler & Greely, Strange Allure, supra note 21, at 1885.
225. The state laws varied somewhat in their details. Most state laws authorized doctors to
prescribe-and companies to provide and charge for-investigational medicines that had completed
phase 1 trials. Some also provided the doctor and company with protection from liability arising from
the injury. E g., 2015 OR. LAws ch. 819 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 127.990 (2019)). Despite these
state laws, federal law continued to prohibit the shipment of unapproved medicines across state lines




federal government eventually provided the catalyst for the federal law.226
Enactment of the right-to-try law thus reflects an alignment between patients'
rights groups and deregulatory libertarians, the seeds of which had been planted
during the Reagan Administration. Like AIDS advocates in the 1990s who were
presented with proposals to dismantle FDA, patients eventually realized that the
right-to-try proposal was not in their interests; it was mainly an attack on FDA
regulatory power and was not designed-or, as explained in the next Section,
likely-to increase their access to unapproved drugs.227 But by then it was too late.
Third, healthcare delivery in the United States is colored by widespread fear,
and even denial, of mortality. Popular culture venerates youthfulness and vigor,
while respectful representations of the elderly and dying are virtually absent.228
Patients and their caregivers are slow to discuss palliative care and slower still to
seek hospice.229 Physicians are often reluctant to begin end-of-life care discussions
with their patients.230 Discussions of terminal illness are cast in metaphors of war,
and death itself characterized as "loss" of a "battle"-creating a sense of failure in
reason: to give effect to the clear policy preference of the states. E.g., Ellen A. Black, State "Right
to Try" Acts: A Good Start, but a Federal Act is Necessary, 45 Sw. L. REv. 719, 755 (2016) (arguing
that "a federal right to try act, such as the Right to Try Act of 2015, is necessary to enable the
implementation of state right to try acts").
226. This pattern is not uncommon. See Diane R. H. Winters, The Benefits of Regulatory
Friction in Shaping Policy, 71 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 228 (2016) (discussing other examples).
227. Carrieri, Peccatori & Boniolo, supra note 20, at 67 (noting that "[right to try] laws appear
to be a largely symbolic attack to the governmental authority of the FDA, masked by libertarian ethos
of conferring more rights to patients"); Barlas, supra note 209, at 741 (noting that the bill was
"presented as a boon to terminally ill individuals" but was in fact "opposed by so many groups
representing them").
228. Kirk Combe & Kenneth Schmader, Naturalized Myths ofAging: Reading Popular Culture,
4 J. AGING & IDENTITY 79 (1999) (concluding that "the majority of Americans have generally
negative attitudes towards elders and the aging process," and that the "ageism" that "permeates our
culture" is in large part due to popular culture's impact on common opinion); see, e.g., Stacy L.
Smith, Marc Choueiti & Katherine Pieper, Over Sixty, Underestimated: A Look atAging on the Silver
Screen in Best Picture Nominated Films, USC ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC'N & JOURNALISM (Feb.
2017), https://www.annenberg.usc.edu/sites/default/files/Over_Sixty_ Underestimated Report
_2_14_17_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U77K-G5XD] (finding that seniors are "scarce" in films and
finding a prevalence of negative verbal and nonverbal references to age).
229. E.g., Lisa Jane Brighton & Katherine Bristowe, Communication in Palliative Care: Talking
about the End of Life, Before the End of Life, 92 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 466 (2016); Aline Sarradon-
Eck et al., Understanding the Barriers to Introducing Early Palliative Care for Patients with Advanced
Cancer: A Qualitative Study, 22 J. PALL. MED. 508 (2019).
230. Kay Manning, Doctors Slow to Have End-of-Life Conversations, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/sc-end-of-life-health-1207-20161205-story.html
[https://perma.cc/V5ZM-QXDX9]; Barbara Feder Ostrov, Most Doctors Unsure How to Discuss
End-of-Life Care, Survey Says, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://khn.org/news/most-
doctors-unsure-how-to-discuss-end-of-life-care-survey-says [https://perma.cc/S2AL-B7EB]; Mieke
Visser, Luke Deliens & Dirk Houttekier, Physician-Related Barriers to Communication and Patient-
and Family-Centered Decision-Making Towards the End of Life in Intensive Care: A Systemic
Review, 18 CRITICAL CARE 604 (2014).
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death and a corresponding sense of obligation to fight.23' This fuels not only an
immense body of research focusing on longevity, but also a powerful technological
imperative-to save life at any cost, to exhaust all possibilities that medical science
has to offer.232 This aligns with a powerful norm in the United States: the duty to
seek to rescue.233 Together, these factors create fertile ground for a law that appears
to give more options to the desperately ill.
In contrast, two aspects of the French legal and cultural landscape make the
"right to try" an unlikely fit.
First, the French healthcare system remains paternalistic. The law only
recently recognized the patient's right to information about his or her own
health.234 Patients have less access to information about medical products than in
the United States and fewer options to purchase medical products without the
involvement of a healthcare professional. There is no direct-to-consumer
advertising of prescription drugs in France.235 Under the "monopole officinal,"
only authorized pharmacies may sell medicines. No medicines are sold over the
counter in the sense that they are sold in the United States-freely at a gas station
or in a grocery store, without the involvement of a pharmacist.236 And although
each country has responded to drug safety tragedies by giving its medicines
regulator more power, the French response-to crises from the Stalinon affair in
231. Eg., Carrieri, Peccatori & Boniolo, supra note 20, at 68 (noting U.S. "social norms and
expectations of maintaining a 'fighting spirit"').
232. Eg., Malinowski, supra note 21, at 632 (noting the "compulsion to exhaust all medical
science resources").
233. Caplan & Moch, Rescue Me, supra note 20.
234. See supra note 82 (discussing the 2002 Patients' Rights Law).
235. Only the United States and New Zealand permit direct-to-consumer advertising of
prescription drugs that includes a description of the uses of the products. C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-
Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 669
(2011).
236. But see AUTORITE DE LA CONCURRENCE, AVIS No 19-A-08 DU 4 AVRIL 2019 RELATIF AUX
SECTEURS DE LA DISTRIBUTION DU MEDICAMENT EN VILLE ET DE LA BIOLOGIE MEDICALE PRIVEE 204-
206 (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2019-05/19a08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D9G-EY2K] (discussing reorganization of the pharmacy monopoly and
recommending that certain health products be allowed for sale outside pharmacies); French Health
Minister Opposed to Selling Over-the-Counter Drugs in Supermarkets, THE LOCAL (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://www.thelocal.fr/20 190405/french-health-minister-opposed-to-selling-over-the-counter-
drugs-in-supermarkets [https://perma.cc/KUP7-3R9C] (noting that French antitrust authority wants
to liberalize the monopole officinal and has recommended permitting sale of certain medicines, such




the 1950s237 to the recent Mediator scandal238-has also included greater
responsibilities for and elevation of the role of pharmacists through the lifecycle
of drugs, from manufacture through delivery to patients.239 Although there has
been a modest patient empowerment movement in France, medical paternalism-
and with it a passive attitude of deference to doctors and pharmacists-still tends
to trump patient autonomy arguments in French culture and law.
Second, French culture and law remain deeply committed to the notion of
equality-in this context, equality of access, treatment, and outcome-tracing its
roots to the principles of political equality that fueled the Revolution of 1789 and
ideals of socioeconomic equality that took root in 1792 (which drove, for example,
the abolition of the entire tax system of the Old Regime).240 This special tradition
has played a powerful role in French politics and culture ever since. It counsels
against laws and policies that might lead to differing results depending on
socioeconomic status, including solutions that allow a patient's initiative and
personal connections to provide treatment options others lack.24' It also tends to
lead to pro-regulatory sentiment, because r gulation can serve the end of ensuring
equality in treatment. Patients have a less aggressive sense of empowerment in
France, and those who might want access for themselves without ANSM's
involvement are less likely to find powerful allies interested in reducing the role
237. In this crisis, an anti-infective drug caused nearly 100 deaths and led to reexamination of
the French system for drug safety monitoring. See generally Christian Bonah & Jean-Paul
Gaudillibre, Faute, accident ou risque iatrogene? La regulation des evenements indesirables du
medicament a l'aune des affaires Stalinon et Distilbdne, 3 REVUE FRANAISE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES
123 (2007) (describing the Stalinon affair and subsequent changes in French drug regulation).
238. Mediator (benfluorex) reached the market in 1976 as an adjunctive therapy for
hyperlipidemia and diabetes with obesity. It was a fenfluramine, and the class was eventually
associated with serious cardiovascular risks and generally withdrawn from the market, but Mediator
remained on the market in Europe until 2009. The company marketing the drug, Servier, had argued
that benfluorex was pharmacologically different from fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine. By 2009,
French doctors had prescribed the drug off label for obesity for decades. Some believe the drug had
caused as many as 2,000 deaths before its withdrawal, and an exhaustive report from the French
Inspection Generale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS) blamed not only the company but also the
regulator, the medical and scientific communities, and the regulatory framework. Asher Mullard,
Mediator Scandal Rocks French Medical Community, 377 THE LANCET 890 (2011).
239. Mathieu Guerriaud, Pharmacien responsable, une exception frangaise au service de la
securite de la securite du medicament, in Mathieu Guerriaud, Clotilde Jourdain-Fortier & Isabelle
Moine-Dupuis, LE DROIT DES AFFAIRES PHARMACEUTIQUES, VERS LA CARACTERISATION D'UNE LEX
PHARMACEUTICA (LexisNexis, forthcoming).
240. See Christian Morrison & Wayne Snyder, The Income Inequality of France in Historical
Perspective, 4 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 59, 70-76 (2000) (discussing changes in 1792 and trends
towards greater income equality over time).
241. Changes made to French law in 2002 illustrate this. As noted supra note 82, historically,
the liability of a private physician was governed by the Civil Code, while the liability of a physician
in a public hospital was governed by public law. But under the Patients' Rights Law of 2002, all
health liability issues are now governed by the Public Health Code, which ensures that patients are
treated equally under the law.
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of the regulatory state.
IV. INCREASING USE OF EXPANDED ACCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Supporters of the right-to-try law said that it addressed two impediments to
use of expanded access in the United States: (1) a burdensome regulatory
framework that either precluded, or at least discouraged, expanded access
arrangements, and (2) the failure of companies to participate in expanded access.242
But the regulatory framework was not the problem. The new law does not permit
access to any more drugs than FDA's expanded access regulations already do, and
in some important respects it is narrower. Moreover, the agency rarely refuses
requests for expanded access.2 43 In addition, as discussed below, the modest
changes made to address company reluctance were probably insufficient. The
right-to-try law is unlikely to increase use of unapproved medicines.24 4 If
policymakers want o increase use of the expanded access regime, they will need
to address the actual impediments to its use. This requires thinking about reasons
companies do not provide access, reasons patients do not request expanded access,
and reasons prescribers refuse to participate in access arrangements.
A. Addressing Barriers to Company Participation in Expanded Access
The primary problem has been that drug companies decline to provide
requested drugs. Supporters of the right-to-try law tried to address this. To begin
with, some companies may be concerned about products liability exposure arising
out of adverse events during expanded access.245 Under the right-to-try law, a
company faces no liability arising out of any act or omission with respect to
medicine provided to patients.246 And some companies may be concerned adverse
242. See generally Corieri, supra note 16.
243. See supra note 109; see also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-18-157T, Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives: FDA's Expanded Access Program 1, 2 (Oct. 3, 2017) ("[O]f the nearly 5,800
expanded access requests that were submitted to FDA from fiscal year 2012 through 2015, FDA
allowed 99 percent to proceed.").
244. E.g., Steven Joffe & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Federal Right-to-Try Legislation
Threatening the FDA 's Public Health Mission, 378 NEw ENG. J. MED. 695, 696 (2018) (arguing that
"the bill would probably have minimal effects ... because it targets alleged barriers to early access
that aren't actually rate-limiting"); Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA 's Role in
Information Production, Past and Future, 102 MINN. L. REv. 2357, 2375-76 (2018) ("The law's
provisions mainly target the FDA, despite the fact that the Agency has not been the main barrier to
access. It will therefore likely do little to help patients.").
245. Shah & Zettler, supra note 21, at 182-83 (discussing company concerns about liability);
see also Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 170 (suggesting "sponsors may face traditional tort
liability if adverse events occur").




outcomes will affect the medicine's labeling or approval, or even trigger an order
to stop ongoing trials.2 47 The right-to-try law limits FDA's use of the data arising
out of the patient's use of the medicine: the agency cannot use a clinical outcome
from use under the right-to-try law to delay approval of the medicine unless the
sponsor requests that use or the agency finds that using the clinical outcome is
critical to determining the medicine's safety.2 48 The exception is essential from a
public health perspective, but it also effectively nullifies the provision; if FDA
needs to use the data, it can and will. Still, concerns about regulatory outcomes and
liability exposure probably do not fully explain the reluctance of companies to
participate in expanded access. Recent scholarship suggests hat concerns about
adverse regulatory outcomes and liability exposure are not well-founded.249 It is
likely that at least the larger and more sophisticated companies knew this.
The real impediment to company participation in expanded access in the
United States might be financial: there is a hypothetical risk of liability and no real
financial upside to participation.250 Experimental drugs are not covered by private
payers or government insurance programs.25 ' The patient must bear the cost of the
247. E.g., Menikoff, supra note 153, at 1061-62 (noting that FDA officials report companies
with concerns that unexpected toxicity in a patient receiving early access will lead to a clinical hold).
248. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-Oa(c)(1) (2018).
249. One study published in 2017 considered regulatory actions takenby FDA on 261 molecular
entities from 2010 through 2016, finding "no instance in which expanded access . . . lead to a negative
regulatory action for drug approval" and only one instance in which a safety event had "what might
be interpreted as a negative effect on product labeling." Jonathan P. Jarow & Richard Moscicki,
Impact of Expanded Access on FDA Regulatory Action and Product Labeling, 51 THERAPEUTIC
INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 787 (2017); see also Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra
note 20, at 980 ("In practice, serious adverse events i  expanded access programs have rarely led to
regulatory problems . . . in the USA: over a 10-year period, only 2 out of 1000 (recent) expanded
access programs according to FDA."). FDA has also reassured companies that adverse events will
"be viewed through the proper lens" and that the notion that adverse events could hold up approval
is "urban lore." Kate Rawson, Expanded Access Data Can Support Approval Decisions, FDA Says,
PINK SHEET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS124296/Expanded-
Access-Data-Can-Support-Approval-Decisions-US-FDA-Says. Another study of programs over a
10-year period found only two instances in which FDA called a temporary halt to ongoing trials after
an event involving a patient who had received early access, out of 11,000 early access arrangements.
Van Norman, supra note 19, at 289; see also Amy McKee et al., How Often Are Drugs Made
Available Under the Food and Drug Administration's Expanded Access Process Approved?, 57 J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY S136 (2017) (reviewing all individual early access requests to FDA's drug
center for Fiscal Year 2010 to Fiscal Year 2014 and reporting no apparent product liability cases
arising out of the use).
250. Grossman, Empowered Consumer, supra note 19, at 672 (suggesting that treatment INDs
are rare in part because of the risk of liability exposure without any prospect for profit).
251. Sutter, Expanded Access Advocates Seek Reimbursement, supra note 212 ("Insurers
generally will not pay for the cost of investigational drugs or for ancillary services unless they
represent standard of care, numerous speakers aid."); Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 168
("Private health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid have not paid for treatment access to
investigational drugs in the past and probably will not pay for such access in the future. Even if
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experimental medicine, unless the company does. And companies are limited in
what they may charge: FDA allows a company to recover only direct costs,
meaning the cost per unit to manufacture the drug (raw materials, labor, supplies
and equipment that are not reusable) and the direct costs to ship and handle the
drug.252 But disclosing direct costs at the preapproval stage could distort the
public's understanding of the true cost of bringing the medicine to market.25 3 The
direct cost of manufacturing a particular unit of medicine-the tablets taken or the
solution prepared and injected-is in many respects a meaningless number, trivial
compared to the fully capitalized cost of more than a decade of premarket research
and development, including any other drugs that failed in premarket trials along
the way. Making the drug available at direct cost before approval can make it
difficult to charge a price after approval that reflects all the cost of bringing the
medicine to market.254 Increasing use of expanded access in the United States may
mean addressing these financial issues.
This hypothesis finds support in the French experience. The French approach
to financing early access is exactly the opposite of the U.S. approach, and some
evidence suggests the French ATU program is more heavily used than the U.S.
expanded access program. To begin with, French law permits drug companies to
profit from ATU arrangements. Pricing is "free"-meaning that the company may
profit from the sale and, indeed, the medicine is technically not subject to the price
patients are only being charged for the cost of the drugs, that cost could be unaffordable for many
low-income persons.").
252. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(1) (2020); Charging for Investigational Drugs Under an
Investigational New Drug Application, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,872, 40,875 (Aug. 13, 2009). Allowing
recovery of costs was intended to address industry "reluctance" to participate in expanded access.
Charging for Investigational Drugs Under an Investigational New Drug Application, 74 Fed. Reg. at
40,905. If a company is providing expanded access to an intermediate-size or large patient
population, it may also recover the costs of monitoring the expanded access protocol, complying
with IND reporting requirements, and other administrative costs directly associated with the
expanded access arrangement. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(2) (2020). A company may not charge for
indirect costs, such as expenditures for physical plant and equipment used to make large quantities
of the drug; research and development costs; or administrative, labor, or other costs that would be
incurred anyway. Charging for Investigational Drugs Under an Investigational New Drug
Application, 74 Fed. Reg. at 40,896.
253. See Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra note 20, at 980 (suggesting that
in the United States, companies preferring not to disclose direct costs may choose to provide for free
or not at all).
254. Sutter, Expanded Access Advocates Seek Reimbursement, supra note 212 (quoting CEO of
a third-party sponsor of large group expanded access programs, that "no company wants" to reveal
its "internal cost structure, which you have to do in any cost recovery," and "then come to market
three years later and have Bernie Sanders tell everybody, 'Hey, here's another pharma company
boosting up their prices."'); cf Lietzan, Access Before Evidence, supra note 30, at 1271-72 (noting
public outrage when a drug made available inexpensively to patients for a time becomes much more




controls that would apply after approval (if it were covered by public insurance)."'
Although companies could choose to provide the drugs for free, many avail
themselves of the opportunity to charge. We know this in part because the French
system ended up changing its charging rules a few years ago to control spiraling
costs.256 Today, a company cannot deviate substantially from the price that will be
set after the medicine's approval.25 7 But it may charge its ordinary price for the
medicine, and the ability to profit could make the ATU attractive to companies,
turning it into the equivalent of early market entry.258
Even if U.S. policymakers did not allow drug companies to profit from
expanded access, they might still need to address the financial impediments that
patients face.25 9 Even though investigational medicines are provided free or at cost,
senior FDA officials report that patients face barriers because of costs unrelated to
the medicine itself, such as laboratory work and infusion services.260 In contrast,
nearly everyone in France is covered by statutory national health insurance, and an
unapproved medicine provided to a patient under an ATU is covered by this
255. For a general overview of pharmaceutical price controls in France, see Marc A. Rodwin,
What Can the United States Learn from Pharmaceutical Spending Controls in France?, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2019/nov/what-can-united-states-learn-drug-spending-controls-france. Broadly speaking,
pricing of covered products is negotiated with the French Economic Committee for Health Products
(CEPS) based in part on the outcome of a health technology assessment regarding the medical benefit
to be derived from the drug (as compared to previous products). See generally Martin Koehring,
Value-Based Healthcare in France: A Slow Adoption of Cost-Effectiveness Criteria, THE ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Dec. 8, 2015), https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/healthcare/value-based-
healthcare-france-slow-adoption-cost-effectiveness-criteria.
256. See infra Section 0. The authors consulted with two individuals who advise companies
providing medicines through ATUs in France. One reported that most of his clients provide the
medicine free of charge, but the other reported the opposite, that most of her clients charge for the
medicine.
257. See infra Section 0.
258. See, e.g., Nathan Kennell, Insights into Utilization of French Compassionate Use
Programs (ATU), LINKEDIN PULSE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/insights-
utilization-french-compassionate-use-programs-nathan-kennell [https://perma.cc/AEF2-RY54]
(using two case studies to describe how the ATU process "presents an avenue to obtain early market
access" and concluding that "effective ATU utilization may lead to earlier, more extensive patient
access, which increases clinical utilization and improves the perceived value of therapy").
259. For similar reasons, some argue that the right-to-try law is unlikely to improve access so
long as payers will not reimburse for the drugs. E.g., Christine Coughlin, Nancy King, & Melissa
McKinney, Regenerative Medicine and the Right to Try, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 590, 618 (2018) ("[R]ight to try legislation does not compel insurance providers to cover the cost
of expanded access to experimental products" and "does nothing to address the reality [that] public
and private payers reasonably question the cost-effectiveness of payment for unproven
interventions."); see also Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra note 20, at 979
(arguing that very little is done in the United States to make investigational drugs available and
accessible and citing, as one explanation, the fact that they are usually not reimbursed).
260. Sutter, Expanded Access Advocates Seek Reimbursement, supra note 212 (noting that
patients sometimes resort to GoFundMe to raise money for expanded access).
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insurance.261 The French early access program is said to be one of the most
attractive (to patients) in Europe because of this reimbursement.262
Many patients use the French early access scheme. The ANSM reports tens of
thousands of patients receiving early access through the ATU mechanism every
year. In 2017, for instance, more than 8,000 patients received medicine through
cohort ATUs, and another 16,000 received medicines through named patient
ATUs.263 Comparable statistics are not readily available for the United States, but
the drug center at FDA receives around 1,000 requests for expanded access every
year, most for single patients, and it grants over 99 percent.264 One report found
that in a recent four-year period, only 4 percent of granted requests pertained to
intermediate or large groups.265 FDA apparently does not keep track of the number
of patients treated under these requests,266 so it is impossible to know whether
fewer patients receive access under treatment INDs in the United States than under
cohort ATUs in France. But many more patients enjoy access to experimental
medicines under the nominative (single patient) ATU in France than receive
expanded access on an individual patient basis in the United States.
The early access schemes of France and the United States are different, but
not different enough to explain this disparity. Something else is going on. One
rational explanation would be that more companies participate when they can
profit and that more patients participate when insurance covers the medicine and
associated care. But there could be additional contributing factors. One might be
261. Cipriano, Conversation, supra note 211. Most countries in Europe do not reimburse
experimental medicines. See Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra note 20, at 980
(noting that France and Turkey have reimbursement systems in place; that in other countries the
financial burden falls on the hospital, the hospital pharmacy, or the patient; and that Dutch hospitals
have policies precluding patients from paying at all which means that if the insurer will not cover the
medicine the hospital will not provide it).
262. See Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little to Lose, supra note 20, at 980.
263. ANSM, SUMMARY ACTIVITY REPORT 2017, 1, 9,
https://www.ansm.sante.fr/var/ansmsite/storage/original/application/f5c61007e0b47de16a3c073 54
eb6f6d6.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4WY-7C48]. Reports in earlier years were similar. See ANSM, 2014
ANNUAL REPORT, 1, 9,
https://ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm_site/storage/original/application/ee4fa2afa64ec300a551d912ff7c055
9.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DWH-52B4] (reporting that 12,111 patients received medicines via cohort
ATUs and 12,822 patients via nominative ATUs); see also Martinalbo, supra note 88, at 103 (noting
in 2016 that French ATU scheme had managed over 130 cohorts since 1994). The schemes do differ
in scope: the French ATU scheme permits access to drugs for rare diseases in addition to drugs for
serious diseases. See supra note 129. But because the diseases are rare, these ATUs probably do not
explain the large disparity in utilization rates.
264. Jarow, ExpandedAccess, upra note 109, at 707; see also Grossman, AIDSActivists, supra
note 59, at 739 (noting that treatment INDs remain rare).
265. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-17-564, Investigational New Drugs: FDA Has
Taken Steps to Improve the Expanded Access Program but Should Further Clarify How Adverse
Events Data Are Used 1, 18 (Jul. 11, 2017).




that new medicine approval in France lags behind new medicine approval in the
United States.267 Once a company is allowed to sell its new medicine in one country
(the United States), perhaps it is more likely to agree to expanded access in the
other (France). That said, the discrepancy between the United States and France
seems to relate to access for single patients, rather than access under treatment
INDs in the United States and cohort ATUs in France. If the explanation were
attributable to FDA approving new medicines before the ANSM approves them,
one might expect the approval lag to manifest mainly in cohort ATUs rather than
nominative, single-patient arrangements. In any case, a review of nominative
ATUs from 2018 shows that the ANSM provides access in many cases before
approval in the United States.268 Finally, even if there are more explanations for
the willingness of companies to participate in France, this brings only one party to
the table. French patients can participate because of robust health insurance
covering both the medicine and the medical services-a benefit that U.S. patients
lack.
B. Addressing the Financial Structure of Expanded Access
The healthcare finance system in the United States is complex, and assessing
a financial solution to the expanded access problem is beyond the scope of this
Article. But a few cautionary points are worth making. The French solution has
many parts that work together. A partial solution in the United States-free pricing
without reimbursement, or reimbursement without free pricing, or free pricing
without either price controls or insurance-may not work and could introduce new
problems.
267. E.g., Nigel S.B. Rawson, Canadian, European and United States New Drug Approval
Times Now Relatively Similar, 96 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 121, 121 (2018) (examining
460 drugs approved by Health Canada, FDA, or the EMA between 2002 and 2016 and finding that
the median EMA approval time was 371 days, while the median FDA approval time was 304 days);
Robera Joppi et al., Food and Drug Administration vs. European Medicines Agency: Review Times
and Clinical Evidence on Novel Drugs at the Time of Approval, 86 BRITISH J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 170, 172 (2019) (finding that the median review time for the 66 drugs approved by
FDA and the EMA in 2015-2017 was longer at the EMA by a median of 121.5 days).
268. While some medicines provided to individual French patients (such as brigatinib) were
already available in the United States, others (such as erdafitinib and alpelisib) would not be approved
by FDA until the following year. For a list of current nominative ATUs, see Referentiel des ATU
nominatives, ANSM, https://www.ansm.sante.fr/Activites/Autorisations-temporaires-d-utilisation-
ATU/Referentiel-des-ATU-nominatives/(offset)/3 [https://perma.cc/F2PV-FWKE]. For a list of past
nominative ATUs, see Liste des specialites autorisees dans le cadre d'ATU nominatives, ANSM,
http://dev4-afssaps-marche2O 17.integra.fr/Activites/Autorisations-temporaires-d-utilisation-
ATU/ATU-nominative-Liste-des-specialites-autorisees/(offset)/3 [https://perma.cc/YT2U-JHSV].
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To begin with, free pricing by itself may exacerbate disparities in access to
experimental medicines.26 9 Even when companies provide their experimental
medicines for free or at cost, there are concerns about allocation. The Josh Hardy
story reveals one issue: companies may respond more to patients who are vocal
and who use social media and political pressure in their campaigns.27 0 The other
issue is ancillary costs. Even if a company provides its experimental medicine for
free, the costs of the associated medical care-physician fees, the costs of services
such as monitoring, the cost of travel and lodging, and opportunity costs for
caregivers who accompany the patient-may limit treatment to patients with more
resources. Even though companies may charge freely in France, the French ATU
scheme is structured to avoid disparities; the ANSM pushes out information about
medicines available through the mechanism,27' patients receive the medicines for
free, and the associated medical care is also covered by national health insurance.
If U.S. policymakers permitted companies to price freely during expanded access
and did not somehow mandate insurance coverage and address other financial
barriers, disparities in access could become profound and would be viewed by
many as morally unacceptable.
Permitting free pricing and somehow covering the cost for patients might
eliminate the inequities in allocation and increase the number of patients enjoying
early access. But it would require thinking about moral hazard. Classical economic
theory tells us that a consumer compares the benefit he expects with the marginal
269. Darrow et al., supra note 139, at 284 (arguing that early access programs "can also raise
concerns about equity" because insurers may not step in when the company declines to shoulder the
cost, leading some to argue "that expanded access generally favors the rich or well-connected over
the poor"); Schtklenk & Lowry, supra note 20, at 16 (citing concern, from a "justice" perspective,
that cost difference might mean the burden of clinical trial participation falls "disproportionately on
members of economically disadvantaged groups"). Cf Carrieri, Peccatori & Boniolo, supra note 20,
at 67 (arguing that he "right to try" law could reinforce preexisting financial inequalities because the
wealthy are more likely to have access to experimental medicines).
270. Caplan & Moch, Rescue Me, supra note 20 ("Should an experimental product be made
available to an individual patient who is more vocal, more sophisticated in the use of media, more
knowledgeable about the system, more adept at electronic searches?"). That said, although
sophisticated use of media and technology to pressure companies appears to be on the rise, it remains
unclear whether these strategies actually work. Mackey & Schoenfeld, supra note 153, at 22-23
(offering "high-profile case studies" in which the patient had "a multimedia strategy in place that was
well-articulated, professionally executed (including various multimedia assets), and included
coordinated message propagation across multiple popular online platforms ... in addition to personal
websites" but noting that "achieving robust public engagement and media coverage did not appear
to associate with better chances of accessing experimental treatment").
271. Unlike FDA, the ANSM maintains a list of medicines that can be prescribed via a
nominative ATU if certain criteria are satisfied (and in all other cases, the doctor may simply apply




cost to him.272 In health care, this generally leads to over-consumption,273 and
particularly at the end of life, this effect could be even more pronounced.274
Terminally ill patients and their caregivers tend to place a high value on extending
life even for a few months, higher than they would if asked earlier in the patient's
life. 275 And for an insured patient in the United States, the marginal financial costs
typically comprise his insurance premium and any co-payments and deductible
involved. A third-party payer covers the full financial cost of the medicine and
associated healthcare services, passing the cost to others (taxpayers in the case of
public insurance, other policy holders in the case of private insurance).
Providing reimbursement, within the context of a national health insurance
system that also covers the cost of associated health care, eliminates most
disparities in access-a goal of the French legal system that generally takes priority
even in the face of arguments about personal autonomy. The persistent paternalism
of the French healthcare system may help reduce the insurance effect, thereby
reducing moral hazard. In contrast, U.S. society emphasizes patients' rights,
worships the technological imperative, and prizes fighting terminal illness over
palliative care and a good death, so mandatory insurance coverage for
experimental medicines could trigger high utilization rates-including the kinds
of last-ditch efforts that family members, caregivers, treating doctors, and even the
patients themselves may in retrospect wish they had not tried.276
272. See generally Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice
Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH.
L. REv. 523, 529-31 (2014).
273. Id. at 529; see also Paul T. Menzel, The Value of Life at the End of Life: A Critical
Assessment of Hope and Other Factors, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 215, 220 (2011) ("Because of the
'insurance effect' . . . what is actually spent is not a good indication of value."); see also Sidney A.
Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 52 ("Expense
accounts, insurance, and medical benefits have the effect of encouraging consumers to spend more
than they would if the expenses were paid directly (internalized) by the consumer .... The economic
difficult with a moral hazard is that costs can be inflated over what they otherwise would be if
someone else were not paying."). There is a large body of empirical literature exploring the impact
of health insurance on spending, which is beyond the scope of this Article. See Liran Einav & Amy
Finkelstein, Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It, 16 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS'N 957 (2018) (describing the literature).
274. Menzel, supra note 273, at 221 ("Insured patients, and often their providers as well, have
an incentive to use every bit of care that has even the slimmest, pie-in-the sky prospect of benefit,
regardless of its cost. People see themselves as having paid their insurance 'dues' already, and their
future premiums will not increase by more than micro-pennies because of their one current use of
marginal care.").
275. Id. at 217 (explaining the apparently high value of life extension, including the fact that six
months of additional life is perceived as higher value by a person with a shorter remaining lifespan,
both because the six additional months represent a greater proportion of his remaining life and
because the gain from the extension is more temporally proximate).
276. For a compelling personal account of experimental treatments that, in retrospect from a
family member's perspective, were the wrong choice, see Malinowski, supra note 21.
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Moral hazard, though, also leads directly to the problem of cost. New
medicines can be expensive while companies recover their investment in research
and development and while their competitors are legally prohibited from making
copies. Free pricing for experimental medicines, combined with mandatory
insurance, could impose significant costs on the U.S. healthcare system. The
French learned this the hard way. A review of all medicines available through ATU
that received marketing authorization between January 1, 2005, and June 30, 2010,
found that a 12% premium on average was paid to companies while a medicine
was on this status.277 They now manage the fiscal impact of early access by
requiring the company to reimburse the government in some cases-including
when the amount paid by the government exceeds a certain threshold and when the
price imposed after approval is lower than the free price during early access.278
Responses from industry have not been positive. Many companies have criticized
the scheme, citing its administrative complexity and the business uncertainties in
free pricing that will be second-guessed later.279 In the United States, price controls
for medicines remain a controversial issue.
Finally, even if companies were allowed to charge normal prices, some might
not participate in expanded access. Companies decline to participate for various
reasons. Liability protection for companies and doctors within the expanded access
framework is important. In addition, some companies will want to focus on
enrolling patients in ongoing trials in order to complete the research needed for
approval. Others might always decline to provide access, as a matter of policy,
thinking that this the best way to avoid a complicated public relations challenge.280
277. Albane Degrassat-Thdas et al., Temporary Authorization for Use: Does the French Patient
Access Programme for Unlicensed Medicines Impact Market Access After Formal Licensing?, 31
PHARMIACOECONOMICS 335, 335 (2013); Eveline Van Keymeulen & Laetitia Benard, New
Requirements for Temporary Authorisations for Use in France, ALLEN & OvERY LIFE SCIENCES HUB
(June 6, 2017), https://www.aolifescienceshub.com/new-requirements-temporary-authorisations-
use-france [https://perma.cc/AL2W-KVC9].
278. Loi 2016-1827 du 23 decembre 2016 de financement de la sdcuritd sociale pour 2017, J.O.,
Dec. 24, 2016, no. 1. See generally Autorisations temporaires d'utilisation (ATU), MINISTERE DES
SOLIDARITES ET DE LA SANTE, https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/soins-et-
maladies/medicaments/professionnels-de-sante/autorisation-de-mise-sur-le-marche/article
/autorisations-temporaires-d-utilisation-atu [https://perma.cc/DVF6-RL5T].
279. Eg., LES ENTREPRISES DU MEDICAMENT, supra note 125 (noting that medicines available
through the ATU scheme are reaching only ten percent of the eligible population and arguing that
the changes wrought by later financing laws-meaning the complex reimbursement requirements-
have made the ATU scheme "very complicated, even ineffective").
280. Whether public relations considerations lead to providing or declining access will vary.
Providing access may be necessary to avoid a public relations nightmare triggered by a sophisticated
and media-savvy patient with a compelling story, but providing access only to patients with the
knowledge and resources to launch a media campaign may raise ethical issues that trigger a different
kind of public scrutiny. Some companies have addressed these issues with external boards that rule
on access requests or with lotteries for expanded access. See Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Little




C. Barriers to Provider and Patient Participation in Expanded Access
Senior FDA officials have reported that many doctors are unwilling to
participate in expanded access because-even if the medicine is provided for free
or at cost-their services are not covered by insurance.28' With little financial
upside, doctors may be deterred by the prospect of liability for injuries that may
result.282 The right-to-try law tries to address this risk, relieving them from
"liability in a cause of action" arising out of an "alleged act or omission with
respect to an eligible investigational drug provided to an eligible patient" unless
there was reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort. 283
Although this provides some coverage, it may simply shift the focus of litigation
to whether the doctor was reckless or grossly negligent. The drafters also
overlooked the relationship between this uncodified liability provision and the
codified provision governing patient eligibility in the first instance. If the patient's
informed consent was not provided, the patient was not an "eligible patient" in the
first place. This appears to leave open the possibility of both a private tort suit
arising out of defective informed consent and proceedings brought by the state's
licensing board. More robust liability protection may be needed to entice doctors
to participate in expanded access.28 4
Finally, more targeted legislation might help address inequities caused by
knowledge deficits in the United States. Perhaps eligible patients do not ask for
early access because they are receiving treatment from physicians unaware of the
option.2 15 Skepticism in minority communities about medical research-the legacy
of significant historical failures in human subject protection-may further
contribute to the knowledge deficit and reduce the number who seek access.286 In
a system that provides early access to those who think to request it-but that does
requests based on "equality, need, and efficacy"). Still others may be concerned about the public
relations challenge in the event of an unforeseen adverse event, particularly if the patient has garnered
sympathetic media attention.
281. Sutter, Expanded Access Advocates Seek Reimbursement, supra note 212.
282. Zettler, Implications, supra note 21, at 170; see also Van Norman, supra note 19, at 289
(noting that physicians may be reluctant to recommend an experimental medicine on the grounds that
they lack enough information make benefit-risk calls).
283. Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 2(b), 132 Stat. 1372 (2018) (not codified).
284. See Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved Drugs, 35
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 316, 317-18 (2007) (discussing theories of physician liability such as common
law fraud, intentional misrepresentation, battery, and lack of informed consent).
285. Cf Bunnik, Aarts & van de Vathorst, Changing Landscape, supra note 20, at 10
(suggesting that low uptake is partially the result of knowledge deficits).
286. Allen L. Gifford et al., Participation in Research and Access to Experimental Treatments
by HIV-Infected Patients, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1373, 1379 (2002) ("[F]ewer than half as many
black patients as white patients attempt to obtain experimental HIV medications, suggesting that
there is less awareness and a more widespread negative attitude about research in minority
communities.").
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not otherwise push out information about the availability of medicines before
approval-patients with less education, less access to information, and fewer (or
less sophisticated) healthcare providers are less likely to receive early access. The
success of relentless social media campaigns and influential public figures in
securing a patient expanded access also favors patients with greater knowledge and
resources. In contrast, in part because of the long tradition of regulating to avoid
disparities and inequities, the French regulator pushes out information about
medicines available through the early access mechanism. In France, knowledge
deficits may be less of an issue.
CONCLUSION
The right-to-try laws were never really about increasing patient access to new
medicines. They were about championing individual rights and patient autonomy
in matters of medical care, at least at the end of life, and reducing the role of the
federal government in such matters. There is room for debate about the merits of a
federal gatekeeper in this exceptional situation, though not (in the view of the
authors) for serious debate about the merits of our common medicine approval
framework. And because the right-to-try law represents a rejection of the basic
assumptions of this framework-the need for high-quality evidence to support
commercial market entry and prescribing decisions, and the importance of a single
scientific regulator assessing the quality of that evidence-it is indefensible on that
ground alone. Moreover, as a way of meaningfully expanding access to
unapproved medicines, or improving the equity of access among groups with
varying socioeconomic statuses and levels of sophistication in medical matters, it
is equally indefensible. Patient groups were slow to realize that the fight for right-
to-try was not really a fight in their interests, and the proponents of this law must
shoulder some of the blame.
There are clear impediments to a fully functional expanded access scheme,
and U.S. policymakers might look to the apparent success of the French ATU
scheme-reported to be one of the most attractive in Europe, from the patient
perspective-for at least some answers. Robust empirical investigation of the
French scheme would be helpful. But there is good reason to think that expanded
access will not be equitably available in this country so long as patients face
significant financial hurdles and healthcare providers need reimbursement for the
services they provide. Consistent and proactive dissemination of information about
available expanded access programs from a trusted party-as in France-might
mitigate some of the knowledge deficit. Allowing the companies to charge freely
for their drugs might tip the balance for some companies, but doing so may create
many follow-on problems, and the full French solution-nationalized health




United States for now. The best short-term solution may be to facilitate financial
support and reimbursement under traditional expanded access programs while
studying the full French solution in more detail.
